
Emotions in Late Modernity

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Chapter 2

Emotive-cognitive rationality, background emotions and emotion work

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Emotive-cognitive rationality, background emotions and emotion work

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Introduction

In spite of recent growing interest in emotions in popular and scientific discourses (Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1), the perception of emotion and reason as strictly separate still dominates in late modernity. The aim of this chapter is to argue that instead of emotion and reason as separate phenomena in social science we need to understand them as entwined and inseparable (see also McKenzie, this volume, Chapter 4). If we do so, we will be able to better understand and explain the social phenomena we study. I will begin by discussing some general different perspectives on the relationship between reason and emotion. Thereafter, I will present a model that serves as a theoretical framework in my own empirical research on the role of emotions in bureaucratic and legal decision making and courtroom practices. In the discussion of the model I will draw on examples from my research on the Swedish courts. I will then revisit an old study of mine on the Swedish Migration Board to further illustrate how the framework functions.

Emotion and reason

The conventional perspective on the relationship between emotion and reason seems to be deeply rooted in the process of Western thinking (see Patulny & Olson, this volume, Chapter 1). It postulates emotion and reason as opposites, one oppositional pair among many in the binary discursive conceptualisation of the world, so typical of modern classificatory systems (Foucault 1971; Jacob 1988; von Wright 1986). Emotion is sorted along with female, nature, body and private, and reason is sorted along with male, civilisation, mind and public.¹ Reddy's (2001) historical analysis of emotional regimes in France in 1700–1850 corroborates this argument as his findings demonstrate the shift in emotional regime from sentimentalism to 'a new democratized code of honour [. . .] to create a new male sphere of public endeavour and private enrichment' (2001, p. 327).

Furthermore, by the turn of the twentieth century, as noted by Laclau in his book *On Populist Reason* (2005), theories of the crowd associated collective

action (the crowd) with emotional contagion, pathology and irrationality, while the individual became associated with rationality and normality. In this way, emotional control was emphasised as an individual faculty, as if collectives were inherently emotionally unstable. Linguistic studies, like Kövecses' (2000) inquiry into emotions and metaphors in different languages, further accentuate the focus on control in the Western world. Kövecses thus suggests that the cross-cultural use of the metaphor of anger as a hot fluid in a container (the body) points to a universal experience of anger-emotions. But he also points out that the metaphorical association of emotions with *control*, *difficulty* or *harm* seems to pertain uniquely to 'the general Western emphasis on controlling emotion and regarding emotions as things that are harmful to the proper functioning of the Western ideal of a rational person' (Kövecses 2001, p. 48).

The strict separation of reason and emotion has been increasingly challenged over the past four to five decades, in both scientific and popular knowledge. The critique of the conventional separation between emotion and reason tallies with an interest in the instrumental use of emotions as conducive for the purposes of capitalism and the market in late modernity, as noted, for instance, by Hochschild (Baumeler 2010; Hochschild 1983; Hochschild 2003; see also Mestrovic 1997; Stearns 1994). This 'critical approach' (Barbalet 1998, p. 38) questions the assumption that emotion is necessarily opposed to reason. Some emotions may be uncontrollable and harmful, namely the primary emotions (fear, anger, sadness etc.; see Ekman 1999). Secondary (social) emotions (see Damasio 1994) instead may support rationality and may also be subject to cognitive regulation or control. According to Barbalet, the critical perspective still maintains the idea that there are purely rational – or *unemotional* – phenomena, for instance, instrumental rationality. Even if scholars admit emotion as sometimes supportive of rationality, and loosen up the idea of emotions as forces of nature not to be trusted in order to maintain rationality, emotion is still seen as separate from reason.

Contrasting the conventional and the critical perspective, Barbalet (1998, p. 45) coins 'the radical approach', that is, the understanding of emotion and reason as continuous, entwined and inseparable. Demonstrating how emotion conveys information that human beings would not be able to collect, compile and to assess merely by cognition (see also Damasio 1994), Barbalet argues that emotion is necessary for all action. Emotions assess information about the landscape in which we move in order for us to act wisely in this landscape (Hochschild 1983; 1990). Instrumental rationality is thus also emotional.

In order to perform instrumental tasks effectively, human actors must not only be committed to the purposes intrinsic to them, but also committed to avoiding extrinsic and distracting purposes. Thus in addition to the particular facilitating emotions which function to motivate instrumental action, such as pride in one's expertise and skill, satisfaction in one's work, distaste for waste of material and time [. . .] there is also a need for emotional distance from potentially disruptive emotions which a wider

involvement with others might bring. That is to say that in instrumental rationality there is a need for what Simmel called the blasé feeling.

(Barbalet 1998, p. 60)

In this quote, emotions of commitment (pride, satisfaction and distaste) and emotional distance (blasé feeling) are suggested to motivate and orient the very performance of instrumental reason. These emotions do not disturb, but rather inform, rational action. Barbalet discusses these emotions as calm and quiet, just below consciousness (Barbalet 2009) and labels them *backgrounded emotions* (Barbalet 2011). Backgrounded emotions ‘function by giving attention to external but not internal objects of emotional apprehension’ (Barbalet 2011, p. 39). This is to say, they are there and they are fundamental to the task in which we are involved, but as they are conducive to the task, they do not become an object of cognitive reflection.

Based on the radical perspective, I argue that rational action is emotional but linked to a particular performance and management of emotions. This perspective also brings to the fore the notion of emotions about emotions, as suggested in the quote above that the blasé feeling is a filter against distracting emotions. This is to say that we can feel that we do not want to feel a particular thing (see Morton 2013, pp. 53–5) and adapt our emotive–cognitive orientation accordingly. I suggest that emotion is not unitary in its action-orientation; different emotions pertaining to mutually exclusive actions may be experienced simultaneously. We can harbour a good deal of contradictory emotions at the same time, but we cannot physically engage in more than one action at a time, unless we deplete our focus and with that our emotional commitment.

Collapsing the separation of emotion and reason thus opens up for consideration the emotionality of actions and dispositions that are not conventionally seen as emotional. It also dismisses the rather fruitless effort to categorise and sort discrete emotions into *positive* versus *negative* emotions, or *primary* versus *secondary*, and instead considers emotion’s relation to action and action outcomes (Barbalet 1998). This is not to say that some specific *rational* emotions are conducive to the rational type of action; at stake is instead the intensity and orientation of the emotions informing action.

Emotion’s relation to action has been discussed in numerous studies across social-scientific disciplines and perspectives; for instance, emotion is practice (Scheer 2012), emotion is relation (Burkitt 2014), emotion produces surfaces and boundaries between bodies, emotions move and stick to bodies and thereby orient action and reaction between bodies (Ahmed 2004), emotion assesses and evaluates action (Archer 2000). Emotions induce – motivate, orient – action (Collins 1993). Considering then emotion’s relation to action, our moral evaluations (positive/negative, controllable/uncontrollable) pertain to the thrust, interpretation and outcome of *action*, our physical involvement in the world, not to the emotions that fuel and inform the action (Barbalet 1998). All emotions may be conducive to rational action, just like all emotions

may also be disruptive. And all emotions can be backgrounded as well as foregrounded. Meanwhile, we almost always have the capacity to self-govern what we feel, because feeling is so fundamentally tied to behaviour, and thereby to behavioural norms and social recognition. Turning this argument around, behind every behavioural norm there are assumptions and norms about emotions, what we should feel and how to express it. In the following section, I will suggest a model for how to combine action, reason, emotion and emotion work (regulation of emotions).

Emotion, action and emotion work

Figure 2.1 (below) visualises the basis of the theoretical framework that I work with to conceptualise how emotion and reason intertwine yet sometimes collide in relation to a specific action/task. It is a synthesis of primarily Hochschild's (1983) theory of emotion work (feeling/display rules) and Barbalet's (1998) backgrounded/foregrounded emotions. Hochschild's (1979; 1983) theory of emotion work should be familiar to most readers as it has been groundbreaking in sociology and related disciplines and the inquiry into the social relevance of emotions. Here, I prefer to use the term




Figure 2.1 Emotion, action and emotion work

emotion work instead of *emotion management* as the former, in my view, is more generic and refers to the regulation of emotions in all settings and in relation to all types of emotional regimes, be it that of the workplace, the peer-group or the family.

The vertical axis represents the degree of emotion's conduciveness versus disruption in relation to a specific action/task. The horizontal axis displays the degree of consciousness of the emotion, going from the foreground – where emotion itself becomes the object of action – to the background – where emotion is conventionally ignored. If emotion is action and emotions orient our attention (and thus action) then we might say that *emotions that are conducive to our present ongoing action are likely not noticed* (Box 1), while *emotions that call our attention to a different action will potentially be experienced as disruptive* (Box 4). Then again, we may attempt to perform multiple tasks simultaneously and we often move between arrays of different ongoing tasks without necessarily reflecting on what we feel, so obviously these emotive-cognitive shifts between different actions can also take place in the background (Box 2). Sometimes we need to consciously evoke a particular emotion in order to get the energy and motivation to perform a specific action (Box 3).

To clarify, let me give some examples from the project *Emotions in Court* (Bergman Blix & Wettergren 2018).

Box 1) The judge in the Swedish court acts on calm background emotions when she chairs a hearing and listens to the parties, keeping her attention on the process and its rules. Her background emotions are (among others) *interest, self-confidence* and professional *pride*, and they are conducive to her task as an attentive chair.

Box 2) The judge is *startled* when she notices that the accused is staring at the victim while telling his version of the story. She then tells the accused to not look at the victim but at her (the judge), and keep talking. The background emotion leading to this shift from listening to correcting the accused is emotional apprehension (worry) that confrontation between the accused and the victim might flare up emotions and disturb the court process. The preventive measure she takes momentarily disrupts her act of listening, but she can then reassume the task without further ado. In an interview, she would be highly unlikely to recall this event as emotional, which is characteristic for background emotions.

Box 4) The accused gets worked up and quite noisy and rude while he is talking. The judge gradually becomes aware of her own feelings of irritation and anger at the accused's lack of appropriate demeanour and deference. The emotional regime of the Swedish court rules out all emotional expressions by professionals, particularly by judges. The judge therefore focuses on her display – keeping it neutral – and on averting her growing emotions of

contempt and anger in order to not be disturbed in her (impartial) listening. She becomes aware of her own disruptive emotions and she is consciously working on them in relation to the regime's feeling and display rules. But she is, simultaneously, also [. . .]

Box 3) [. . .] working up her conducive emotions of (non-judgemental) calm and interest to continue perform the listening (she tries to stay focused). In the Swedish context we have seen that in this situation a sometimes disruptive emotion reported by judges is the insecurity they feel around the decision to act/not act on their irritation by reproaching the accused.

A less complex example of Box 3 is as follows: prior to a very ordinary and boring small trial, the judge chitchats with the three lay judges to summon *curiosity* and direct their focus towards interesting aspects of the case at hand. Just before opening the trial s/he cheerfully shouts 'Alright?! Is everybody on board? Then let's roll!' In this example the judge counteracts disinterest and boredom that may be attached to this type of trial (called *grey-hearings* in Swedish), trying to evoke instead a good-humoured curiosity in petty crime.

Assumptions and implications of the model

The model in Figure 2.1 is – as models tend to be – static. Some of its underlying assumptions and inherent consequences therefore need to be explicated. First, it should be clear that we are always emotional; there is no such thing as an unemotional (living) human being, as emotions constitute the condition for being in the world. We feel because we have bodies and our bodies are inserted into the physical world and convey information to us through emotions (Damasio 2000).

Second, what I call background emotions are undefined – they are bundles of emotions or emotional processes, or what Reddy (2001, pp. 102–105) would call 'thought material'. They are at the outskirts of consciousness. It is only when we reflect upon them that they become emotions with distinct cultural labels, norms and beliefs attached to them (Thoits 1989). Whether we reflect upon them or not, they fuel and orient our actions. Third, it follows that we feel many things at the same time but when we reflect upon what we feel we *settle* the emotion with the help of culturally available language and knowledge. The emotion word we settle for is performative – that is, it helps in creating the emotion we express. This is essential to Reddy's theory about 'emotives' (Reddy 2001, p. 128; see also Hochschild 1983).

Fourth, emotion work takes place in relation to a social context and its feeling and display rules, which are often just tacit norms, and just like every other norm-conforming behaviour it is sanctioned by feelings of shame and pride. In other words: *we feel about what we feel*. So we can *feel* that we *do not want to feel* a particular thing. For example, Bergman Blix and I (Wettergren & Bergman

Blix 2016) have argued that prosecutors' empathy is a prerequisite for their professional and objective work but that their empathic scope is limited by what we call the emotive-cognitive judicial frame (see below), preventing them from being overwhelmed (and disrupted in their professional tasks) by the tragedy and horror of crime. The orientation of the emotive-cognitive judicial frame in this regard is performed by feeling. The prosecutors feel aversion against feeling outrage, sorrow, sympathy, horror and pain every time they read the protocol about a murder or child abuse. And they certainly feel aversion against feeling the weight of guilt when the case cannot be prosecuted due to lack of evidence (see Törnqvist 2017). None of these feelings would be conducive to performing the prosecutors' work. Aversion to these feelings is built into the emotive-cognitive judicial frame, enabling prosecutors to navigate around these feelings. When they talk about, reflect upon, their feelings – for example, in an interview – they use emotives (Reddy 2001) to create desired feeling-states of professional pride and satisfaction (Törnqvist 2017). Furthermore, the narratives they draw from circulate in collective emotion management at the prosecution office, that is, an ongoing dialogue and exchange of emotions in interactions with colleagues, under the auspices of the emotive-cognitive judicial frame.

Fifth, through primary and secondary socialisation – through the repetition and training of child-rearing, education, re-education – we *habituate* emotion work. This brings us to the interesting conclusion that emotion work can also become backgrounded – and, therefore, habituated. In other words, emotional regimes – learnt feeling and expression rules – become *natural*. They become embodied and internalised. Bergman Blix (2010) has shown in detail how habituation takes place in stage actors' repetition of a character – in the end mere cues such as standing on a particular spot on the stage evoke a particular emotional expression. Similarly, when experienced judges put on the costume, take seat in court and open the trial, their faces become sternly neutral – equaling no emotional expression. As stated by Monique Scheer (2012, p. 205) in her article about emotional practice: 'The habitus specifies what is "feelable" in a specific setting, orients the mind/body in a certain direction'.

Emotional regime vs emotive-cognitive frame

The examples discussed in relation to the model above mention the concepts *emotional regime* and *emotive-cognitive frame* and imply a difference between them. As defined by Reddy (2001, p. 129) an emotional regime is 'a set of normative emotions and the official rituals, practices, and emotives that express and inculcate them'. In earlier work, I have defined an emotional regime as 'the set of tacit and explicit knowledge about emotion, including when certain emotions are appropriate and how they should be displayed, embedded in behavioural norms pertinent to given social groups' (Wettergren & Jansson 2013, p. 426). In our research on the Swedish courts, we have worked with 'judicial emotional regime' as an overarching concept (Bergman Blix & Wettergren 2016)

similar to Maroney's *script of judicial dispassion* (Maroney 2011). An emotional regime in this regard may be something one consciously moves in and out of, while regulating emotions accordingly; it does not need to be embodied. Through our empirical analysis, however, emerged a need to further emphasise both that emotion and cognition were inseparable, and that the norms governing thoughts, feelings, expressions and behaviour in our participant judges and prosecutors were indeed embodied. The emotion work of shifting between different contexts at work associated with stricter or laxer alignment with the dispassionate emotional regime was entirely backgrounded.

The notion of frame derives from Goffman (1974) and in his later writing refers to something deeper and more internalised than norms (see also Bergman Blix & Wettergren 2018). A frame consists of social constraints.

These [social constraints] are not rules that people have learned to carry around in their heads, but are ways in which situations unfold, so that participants feel they have to behave in a certain way, or make amends for not doing so. It is the frames that are the constraints. Even when they are broken, the situation that emerges remains constraining in a predictable transformed way.
(Collins 1988, p. 57)

Bergman Blix and I (2018, p. 22) thus argue that 'the emotive-cognitive judicial frame is [. . .] a restricted behavioural script or habitus for law professionals'. The notion of emotive-cognitive captures the entwined emotional and cognitive process of habituating and sustaining the frame; it is not merely a process of *learning to feel* but simultaneously *learning to think* in particular ways (and the reverse). In the case of legal professionals, they have been implicitly trained, for years and years, how to feel and how to perform their professional emotions by explicitly learning how to think – therefore, by focusing merely on learning the cognitive skills of judicial encoding and judicial expertise.

In the next section I will revisit my work on the Swedish Migration Board (Wettergren 2010) in order to illustrate this theoretical framework with a case in which the emotive-cognitive judicial frame has not been habituated as profoundly as in the case of the Swedish law professionals.

The Migration Board: procedural correctness

The Swedish Migration Board is a public bureaucracy and part of the Swedish law enforcement system in the sense that it is occupied (among many things) with the implementation and effectuation of the Aliens' Act. In this sense the board is governed by an overall emotional regime of bureaucratic dispassion pertinent to legal institutions. As we will see, however, the emotive-cognitive judicial frame does not really apply here.

The case officers in my study worked at the department of asylum assessments, and their work was to investigate asylum applications and present a

proposal to the decision maker – usually a senior employee at the department. I did ethnographic field work at one of the departments for the assessment of asylum applications in 2007 (for more information on method and material, see Wettergren 2010; 2013). The staff at the department were relatively young, and most held degrees in various social-scientific disciplines, with the rare exception of holding a degree in law. This is important because the habituation of the emotive-cognitive judicial frame begins in law school (see Flower 2014), and although it takes many years of additional training before the professional emotion work of lawyers actually becomes habituated and backgrounded, graduates from law school have habituated a sense of pride in judicial skills and an aesthetic pleasure in the method of legal evaluations that were rather superficial in the young case officers working at the department.

Nevertheless, my findings suggested that officers collectively upheld the idea of the perfect law (the Aliens Act), allowing them to feel that it was possible to carry out the assessment of asylum applications in a good and just way, if only the officers adhered to the law and to *procedural correctness* (compare Weber 1948). Thereby, they could preserve their sense of being good people. That they had to struggle to make ends meet in this regard had to do with i) lacking the habituated emotional orientation of legal expertise, and ii) the fact that the migration board is not a court and the assessments of the case officers were not purely concerned with the application of the law, even if they argued so (see below).

Emotions were said to have no relevance at all for their decisions – their work was strictly regulated by the law. But in my observations at the department (including the officers' hearings of asylum seekers) and in interviews with the officers, there was ambiguity. The adaptation of formal legal paragraphs to the complexity of asylum seekers' situation had to be done by the officers themselves. Most applications had to begin with an assessment of the individual asylum seeker's trustworthiness; only after facts like identity and country of origin were proven (e.g., with identity documents) could the story of the asylum seeker be assessed in relation to the law. The story itself had to be credible and the burden of evidence was on the asylum seeker, who often had very little or rather vague evidence to support an application (see also Wettergren & Wikström 2013).

The participant officers in my study said that most of the time the work was routine (and, as they saw it, unemotional). But they also told of occasions when it felt really bad to deny someone asylum because they felt sympathetic to that person. Paradoxically, these were occasions when they truly felt that they acted professionally because they consciously had to put their regret and sympathy aside, so these were proud stories mixed with regret. In these cases, officers talked about how they imagined that the procedural correctness of the asylum assessment ought to comfort the rejected asylum seeker; he or she would feel that the process had been fair, that he or she was treated respectfully and that the decision was transparent and logical. They also told of situations when their *gut feeling* of distrust in someone had put them on the track to expose him or her as a *false* asylum seeker; these were stories of proud professionalism

where emotions had been conducive to acting professionally. Most interesting was that participants also told of occasions when ‘grey-zones’ in the law had enabled them to argue in favour of someone they felt really should have the right to receive asylum. These were stories of joy because they were stories of professional satisfaction and personal sympathies united (Wettergren 2010).

In terms of the theoretical framework presented earlier, it is these foreground-emotional incidents that are of interest (the background emotions pertain to the ‘un-emotional’ routine) because they highlight the conscious effort to align with the feeling rules of the dispassionate emotional regime at work.

I argue that even when emotions are silenced because they are perceived as unprofessional, the very performance of this professional script requires emotion work in order to silence emotions. In the department studied, part of this work was performed individually, but there were also numerous meetings and workshops when the staff was trained in how to apply the law and how to behave in the hearings, client treatment and so on. Even if these meetings did not mention emotions, they tacitly conveyed emotion norms of professional behaviour and procedural correctness.

The fact that emotions continued to orient the work even when – according to the participants – there were no emotions was seen in the assessments of trustworthiness of asylum seekers. The ‘gut feeling’ mentioned above can be seen here as a way to speak about the background emotion of accumulated experience (Damasio 2009) – the sense that an asylum seeker’s story requires further investigation. Yet reflecting on the gut feeling makes it a foreground emotion, an emotion that disturbs and thus calls for conscious reflection. The gut feeling was heeded and allowed to orient further investigation because it was conducive to professional goals.

Although the migration board staff emphasised that emotions were not involved in their assessments, we see that this emotive-cognitive frame of the workplace was barely habituated and emotions surfaced in the ways described above. This may be due to the fact that none of the staff had been working for more than a couple of years with asylum assessments.² It was fairly easy to observe the laborious conscious effort to hide emotion behind an unemotional façade or stone-face in the hearings with asylum seekers. The officers also easily described or displayed emotions in interviews and as we have seen they admitted feeling ambivalent in relation to many of the rejections they made; they felt both professional pride and regret. In this sense, the emotion work they needed to do was still conscious and foregrounded. As they clung to the idea of procedural correctness, it could be seen more as a comfort to them than to the asylum seekers. That it was really essential for the officers to believe that procedural correctness made a difference is illustrated in the quote below, about evidence to the contrary.

The strength of the idea may be illustrated by an incident retold by one officer, where an asylum seeker who he had rejected telephoned to say that he was about to commit suicide. The officer was ‘completely shocked!’

and engaged in a desperate effort to talk the applicant out of it by means of explaining the law: ‘Has it not been explained to you? Then I want to do it now’. The incident ruined the officer’s weekend and though he was confident that the local social welfare office was dealing with the case, he did not want to know the end of the story: ‘I could have found out what happened after that but, I don’t know, I didn’t. I just [snaps fingers] blocked it there and then’.

(Wettergren 2010, pp. 409–10)

The blocking in this quote represents emotion work in order to *not feel* the emotions that might follow from realising what rejection meant to the asylum seeker, regardless of procedural correctness. We also gather that it was a foreground effort; the fact that the weekend was ruined is telling of how focus was shifted from things the officer had planned to do to the conscious and laborious effort of controlling and adapting his disruptive emotions.

Conclusion

In late modernity there is a growing awareness that the sharp distinction between emotion and reason – fundamental to Western modernity – does not really hold. There is also a growing interest in the study of emotions in social science. The perspective that I have embraced here asserts that emotions are fundamental to all human action, be it rational or irrational, and my contribution consists in emphasising that they are learnt and habituated through continuous interactions with specific social contexts or frames. With inspiration from emotion-sociological theories, I presented a model arguing that foreground emotion can be experienced both as conducive and as disruptive to rational goal-oriented action, depending on whether the emotion is internal or external to the desired action. In both cases, it demands conscious emotion work. However, in the former, an emotion is consciously summoned to help a desired action; in the latter it is consciously put aside or changed to not interrupt a desired action. Importantly, both conducive and disruptive action can be backgrounded as well. In the former case, emotion goes unnoticed as a background emotion, and in the latter the disturbance is contained enough to be managed by habituated emotion work. This is where my model attempts to make a contribution to existing theory and research; not only emotions but also emotion work becomes trained and, over time, embodied and backgrounded.

When this habituation (embodiment and backgrounding) takes place, we are likely to feel that our emotive-cognitive behaviour is ‘natural and spontaneous’ (for instance, the emotive-cognitive frame of private life) or ‘self-evidently professional’ – even ‘objective’, as is the case with the legal professionals and the emotive-cognitive judicial frame. In contrast, I argued that the case officers at the migration board struggled to acquire an emotive-cognitive frame

pertaining to the overall regime of judicial dispassion. In the example of the migration board officers, both emotions conducive to professional behaviour and those disruptive of it were still in the foreground.

In this chapter I have argued for doing away with the separation of emotion and reason altogether. This is arguably difficult in practice due to – among other things – the fact that the bifurcation of emotion and reason is deeply embedded in Western conceptual thinking, in philosophy and science as well as in everyday language and practice. The emerging critique of this Western thinking, seen in late modernity, moreover seems to go different ways. For instance, as some emotions become recognised as conducive to some action, there is a widely spread idea – in therapeutic contexts, in self-help literature and so on – that by an instrumental attitude to their emotions, individuals can alter their life chances and influence their own health. This critique of the separation between emotion and reason feeds into processes of governing and responsabilisation fundamental to the *radical individualism* (Mitchell 2005) of late modernity. The approach to emotion and reason suggested in this chapter avoids such neoliberal co-optation by undoing the categorisation of emotions into useful versus non-useful emotions, instead focusing on the intensity and orientation of emotion as it fuels and informs action.

Notes

- 1 In the history and philosophy of ideas, the scientific revolution is considered to be the origin of the thought patterns that subjected nature, body, femininity and eventually emotions to civilisation, mind, masculinity and reason (von Wright 1994, pp. 44–65; Jacob 1988, pp. 31–6, 54–72; see also Barbalet 1998, pp. 11–20). René Descartes is seen as the most influential thinker in this vein, particularly, as noted by Damasio (1994), for the juxtaposition of emotion and reason. But he was preceded and accompanied by many others, most notably Lord Francis Bacon, who was among the first to advocate induction as a scientific method. On the domination of nature as a woman, von Wright writes about the foundation of the scientific academy The Royal Society (established in 1660), which was inspired by Bacon's ideas.

It is striking that the language on which both Bacon himself and the founders of The Royal Society describe their program is permeated by sexual symbolism. Nature is the *woman* that the *man* of science shall subject. He shall systematically unveil Mother Nature, expose her secrets, penetrate her womb and thereby force her to complete subjection. The new scientific attitude is thereby given a strong masculine image from the beginning.

(von Wright 1999, p. 65, author's translation from Swedish)

- The subjection of emotion is tied to the subjection of women, as femininity according to this logic becomes associated with sentimentality and the private sphere, while masculinity is associated with reason and the public sphere (Jónasdóttir 1988).
- 2 According to the participants in the study, employee turnover was rather high at the department and they emphasised that this was good as it prevented them from

becoming 'cynical' (Wettergren 2010, pp. 404–405). There were stories circulating about case officers at other asylum assessment departments who had worked too long and who had stopped listening to the asylum seekers, believing that most of them were liars (Wettergren 2010; 2013). It may be that the emotive-cognitive frame of the migration board asylum investigation officers was in fact a cynical one, but this would need further investigation.

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