Chapter 3

The police intelligence division-of-labour

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ABSTRACT
This article describes the police intelligence division-of-labour. It is argued that police organisation gains overall coherence in relation to the 'police métier'; a rationale that allows protagonists in the police world to make sense of an irrational workplace structure where personal loyalty, trust and honour (not formal organisational logic) form the basis of action and compliance. The concept of the police métier is defined in terms of the police professional concern with the mastery of surveillance and coercion in the reproduction of order, the making of crime and the governance of insecurity, and it is the polestar of the police mindset. The article describes the police intelligence division-of-labour paying specific attention to four different aspects of intelligence activity: the acquisition of intelligence or information; the analysis of information in the production of intelligence; tasking and co-ordination on the basis of intelligence ‘product’; or being tasked on that same basis. The descriptive analysis presented here is useful in several respects. Firstly it provides a basis for the comparative study of police intelligence work and its configuration within broader processes of security governance. Secondly, it provides a prototypical organisational map useful understanding the orientation of particular units – the organisational elements of policework (e.g. of drug squads, primary response, public order and homicide investigation units) – within the broader police division-of-labour. Lastly, it provides a complex view of issues concerning democratic governance of ‘the police’ as they are configured as nodes within broader networks of security governance.

Introduction
In the sociology study of police organisation, the term boundary has been understood to refer to organisational units (intra-organisational policing) and institutions (inter-organisational policing) and the co-ordination work necessary for their coherent operation has emerged as an important concern (Giacomantonio 2014, 2015). Understanding how different police units form, function and interact with each other in police organisations is a vital aspect of police research. This paper describes the police intelligence division-of-labour, here understood as intra-organisational information and intelligence flows bounded within the archetypal form of the multi-functional urban police service. It is a useful if not necessary prior step in understanding how inter-organisational boundaries work in police organisation (Sanders and Henderson 2013; Delpuech and Ross 2016).

As certain police researchers will know from experience, there is a sense of being ‘inside’ the police organisation and some author’s use of the dramaturgical metaphor draws specific attention to both
‘front stage’ and ‘back stage’ arenas for the performance of policing (Young 1991; Manning 1997; Moskos 2008, Fassin 2011). From such a perspective, multi-agency work has both ‘open’ and ‘hidden’ aspects for the actors participating in what amounts to co-operative organisational boundary maintenance (Giacomantonio 2014; 2015). If a particular police institution is acting as a node in a broader network of security, what goes on inside the node (Sheptycki 2017)? A general theory of police information networking is the Holly Grail of the intelligence-led policing perspective, long sought and yet to be discovered (James 2003, 2013; Ratcliffe 2016). What is presented here is a general description concerning how a multiplicity of different types of intelligence and information, knowledge and facts, percolates within a multi-functional division-of-labour organised around the police métier.

A great deal of the literature on police organisation rests on a sometimes overt, but more often subconscious belief that it is machine-like. For example, some of the literature on intelligence and police security networks has used the metaphor of ‘cybernetics’, which is a form of machine-thinking (e.g. Gill 1998). According to Robert Reiner, bureaucratic rationality, the rule of law and formal accountability structures in the service of efficient and effective police service have under-pinned claims to police legitimacy (Reiner 2010). Projecting an image of formal rationality is very important to police decision-makers and police actors. The police are frequently imagined as a rank-structured, bureaucratically organised, rational, institutional machine (Maguire 2010; Jobard and de Maillard 2015). As sophisticated research on police organisation further reveals, police organisation seldom conforms to machine-like rationality (Manning 1997; Maguire and Uchida 2015) and, indeed, sometimes other more powerful motives propel police action (Hobbs 1988). The vital importance of informal information exchange to the achievement of police organisational goals is acknowledged in the literature (e.g. Bayer 2010). Nonetheless, the machine metaphor is reoccurring, especially when articulating measures for controlling police malpractice (Punch 2011) and governing the police (Jones et al. 1996; Stenning 2009). In the literature on intelligence modelling, flows, cycles and the management thereof, police organisation is continuously re-imagined as a cybernetic network of computational analysis (Ratcliffe 2016).

The following discussion develops a vocabulary of seven types or focal points of intelligence and locates them with reference to an ideal-typification of the modern multi-functional police organisation (Mouhanna 2009; Manning 2010; Jobard and de Maillard 2015; Maguire and Uchida 2015). There is a deliberate attempt to avoid depicting police organisation as a hierarchical and mechanistic set of arrangements in recognition that empirical observation has long confirmed that police organisation is idiosyncratic (e.g. Manning and van Maanen 1978; Monjardet 1985, 1996; Manning 1997; Chan 2003; Marks and Sklansky 2013). According to a report published by the US Department of Justice, ‘traditional, hierarchical intelligence functions need to be reexamined and replace with co-operative, fluid structures that can collect information and move intelligence to end users more quickly (Peterson 2005, p. vii, emphasis mine)’. Since contemporary official expectations are that police intelligence systems should become more fluid, analytical descriptions ought not to smuggle mechanistic assumptions in by the back door (Sheptycki 2017). A challenge inherent when attempting to analytically describe the police intelligence division-of-labour is how to avoid machine-thinking.

Here it is argued that police organisation gains its overall coherence insofar as it is formed around what is referred to as the ‘police métier’, a term adopted from Manning (2010). According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term métier is derived from ancient Latin and came to the English language via the Norman French. Originally the term was misterium, from which we get modern terms like Ministry and Mister. The word is probably also etymologically linked with the term
mysterium, from which we get our modern word mystery. A métier is someone’s profession, the implication being that membership includes some secret knowledge which is privilege of professional insiders. The police métier undergirds a specific intuitive grasp of situations peculiar to the police occupation (Bittner 1970; van Maanen 1974; Young 1991; Chan 2003). Peter K. Manning has made a persuasive case that translating occurrences from the general lifeworld into criminal ‘incidents’ and perhaps transforming those into a ‘case’ for criminal prosecution is the essential basis and the sacred centre of the police métier (Manning 2010, 2016). In this sense, the term police métier is understood to be a set of habits and assumptions focused on the trope of ‘crime’ that ‘envisions only the need to control, deter and punish the visible and known contestants’ (Manning 2010, p. 105–106). Understanding of the term is both broadened and deepened here. Following Brodeur (2007, 2010), Bittner (1970) and others, here the essence of police professionalism is understood to centre on the mastery of surveillance and coercion in the reproduction of order (Ericson 1982), the making of crime (Ericson 1981) and the governance of insecurity (Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Ericson 2007). The ‘fundamental mindset’ (Sklansky 2011) of ‘the police’ is oriented towards their métier like a sailor to the polestar.

The typical multi-functional police service found cities in North America and the UK, and some cities in Europe, assumes wide responsibilities – from traffic enforcement to policing protest. In the discussion that follows, it is understood that the police division-of-labour gains overall coherence as a set of organisational practices not because of functional command-and-control relationships. Analytically, they are to be understood in terms of positioning in the police division-of-labour and the intersecting intelligence foci. The processes undertaken within the police intelligence division-of-labour – its routines, recipes, rituals and roles – are interpretable in terms of specific orientations to the police métier.

This article is organised in a number of sections. First is outlined the model police division-of-labour typical of the modern multi-functional urban police department. This is followed by a brief enumeration of seven foci of policing intelligence and a discussion of how these relate to various positions within the police division-of-labour. Analytically speaking, different positions within this configuration are concerned with four different aspects of intelligence activity: the acquisition of intelligence or information; the analysis of information in the production of intelligence; tasking and co-ordination on the basis of intelligence ‘product’; or being tasked on that same basis. This picture of the police intelligence division-of-labour compliments the view of police organisations consisting of ‘units’ that police the boundaries between themselves (Giacomantonio 2015). Describing the police intelligence division-of-labour offers a useful guide for future comparative analysis of specific police institutions. It also provides an organisational map for charting the relations between different units that make up the contemporary urban police service as described in ethnographic accounts of, for example, drugs units (Bacon 2016), front-line primary response units (PRUs) (Moskos 2008), public order units (Jefferson 1990), homicide investigations (Innes 2003) and other ‘units’ that comprise an essential part of the policing web (Brodeur 2010). Further, describing the police intelligence division-of-labour as it is configured within the typical urban police department is essential to understanding how it fits in with security governance more generally (Johnston and Shearing 2003; Shearing and Marks 2011). A fortiori, it raises complex issues regarding the politics and governance of police (Ericson and Haggerty 2005). Ultimately this contribution helps in explaining the configuration of broader nodal relations of security governance in which police organisation is ‘interpellated’ (Boussard et al. 2006).²

The police division-of-labour

Police organisations are depicted in organisational diagrams which usually show the office of the chief at the apex of an organisational pyramid and array police departmental resources below it in hierarchical fashion reinforcing the image of a ‘chain of command’. This common picture is modestly inaccurate. The orchestra pays only minimum heed to the conductor, or, in the words of Peter
Moskos, ‘The chain of command is a myth. A sergeant cannot be in active command of five units simultaneously’ (2008, p. 112). Another reason why police organisational charts are rather fictitious is that they emphasise formal top-down relations between units leaving out the many horizontal connections and informal relations. They miss the fluidity of an organisation where individuals perform a variety of functions from patrol to office administration and frequently move between roles throughout a career lifetime. The ‘hierarchical fiction’ is important to keep in mind when describing the police division-of-labour in general and abstract terms because the description may blend with common conceptions of what the police do and how the organisation works which ‘tend to be wrong’ (Smith and Gray 1985, p. 309; Hobbs 1986, p. 198). Manning (2010), police are authoritatively co-ordinated, legitimate organisations that employ practices aimed at tracking, surveillance and arrest and remain ready to apply force, up to and including fatal force, in pursuit of the general organisational goal of maintaining social order and governing crime and insecurity. Multi-functional police agencies are also called upon to undertake a host of social service functions, for example, including responding to issues concerning homelessness, mental health and psychological distress. In Egon Bittner’s wonderful turn of phrase, urban police have an emergency role in responding to myriad situations that cannot be predicted in advance and that can only be characterised as ‘something that ought not to be happening about which something ought to be done now’ (Bittner 1970; Brodeur 2007). According to Giacomantonio it is ‘hard to imagine a public police force being organised – and considered legitimate – without at minimum a uniformed patrol division and reactive investigative services that deal with local crime and order problems’ (2015, p. 20).

Table 1 presents an ideal-type model of the modern multi-functional police service. Manning observed that police organisations hold in reserve slack personnel resources that can be mobilised in the event of emergency (Manning 1992, p. 354–355). So, for example, resources indicated under the auspices of uniformed patrol in this diagram might be mustered under the heading of an operational public order support unit or an officer who is normally part of a community contact unit may also have a skill set (rarely put to use) in bomb disposal. Movable and capable of coming together into units, squads, or teams that sometimes behave with military precision, the police organisation is flexible while it remains fundamentally oriented around the police métier. At minimum, the typical multi-functional police agency will have the capacity to deploy officers on uniform patrol (depicted in the top left of the diagram and split into three functions: PRUs, community response units (CRUs) and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>UNIFORM PATROL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsibilities</td>
<td>- Incident response - Directed patrol - Proactive patrol</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRUs</td>
<td>- Neighbourhood liaison - Incident follow-up - Youth &amp; School liaison - Community partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRAFFIC</td>
<td>- Traffic enforcement - Directed Patrol - Impaired Driving Check-stop</td>
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<tr>
<th>GENERAL INVESTIGATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BY CRIME TYPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Auto Theft - Theft from Autos - Assault - Sexual assault - Robbery &amp; theft - Breaking &amp; Entering (Household) - Breaking &amp; Entering (commercial)</td>
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<tr>
<th>SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE SQUADS</th>
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<tr>
<td>BY CRIME TYPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Homicide - Armed Robbery - Prostitution - Illegal Gambling - Drugs - Guns &amp; Gangs - Fraud - Organized theft &amp; handling - Repeat Offenders</td>
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<th>INTELLIGENCE BUREAU</th>
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<tr>
<td>INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS</td>
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<tr>
<td>- OC Threat Assessment - CT Threat Assessment - Operational Project Development - Strategic public order analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Covert Surveillance - Electronic Surveillance - Informant Handling - Forensics - Digital Forensics - Sex crimes &amp; Cyber Crime</td>
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<th>OPERATIONAL SUPPORT</th>
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<tr>
<td>BY FUNCTION</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Canine handlers - Horse Mounted - Marine Unit - Aerial Surveillance Unit - VIP Close Protection - ETF (SWAT) - Public Order, Riot Squad &amp; Special Patrol Group</td>
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traffic patrol) and will likely have the capacity to undertake investigations into ‘high volume’ crime (depicted on the bottom left). Central administrative functions, such as managing human resources and other administrative records are depicted at the top right-hand side of the diagram. Most, if not all, North American and British police services have a mixture of specialist detective squads (Hobbs 2013, p. 29) depicted in the bottom centre-left. Increasingly these police agencies are creating centralised intelligence centres or bureaus which is depicted in the bottom centre right. In this table, within the intelligence bureau a distinction is drawn between intelligence analysis and intelligence operations. Lastly, in most medium to large-scale multi-functional police services there are an array of operational support units – K9 unit, aerial reconnaissance, SWAT, etc. – and these specialist operational support units are depicted in the lower right-hand quadrant of the diagram. Such units are expensive to maintain and are, in a sense, a luxury. They are, however, redolent of the police métier. Percolating through the police division-of-labour is a myriad of knowledge, facts, information and intelligence that can be described, again in ideal-typical terms, as the seven intelligence foci of police knowledge work.

**Seven foci of police intelligence**

Echoing Delpeuch and Ross (2016), there are a plurality of intelligence foci that are put to use in the police organisation. Different kinds of knowledge, facts and information are considered relevant and in different ways depending on where particular actors are located within the police division-of-labour. In ideal-typical terms, there seven foci of police intelligence and chief among them are those having to do with criminal intelligence and public order intelligence (de Lint 2009; McCue 2014). These foci of intelligence are obviously closely aligned with the police métier. Using these lenses, police organisations amass information from a variety of sources about known and suspected criminals, troublesome persons and locations. Analysing these data, police organise to identify occurrences that can be translated into incidents and on that basis pursue an organisational response. In intelligence terms, responses can be reactive, that is intended to support the investigation of past occurrences for translation into criminal incidents pursuable as cases. A key terminological boundary here is the distinction between ‘criminal intelligence’ and ‘criminal evidence’. The former has a projected ‘internal career’, the latter a projected ‘external career’ (Travers and Manzo 1997). Police insiders aim to keep criminal intelligence within the purview of a very narrow audience, whereas evidence is a matter of public record. Criminal intelligence can also be used as the basis of proactive policing. Proactive policing occurs when police resources are deployed on the basis of crime analysis (e.g. geo-temporal crime pattern analysis) with the intention of affecting some future situation (Manning 2008). Another two intelligence foci are serious organised crime and counter-terrorism. These lenses also have proactive and reactive aspects and are also closely oriented to the police métier. They are different for the degree of seriousness accorded to them and the consequently greater emphasis on proactive intelligence thinking. Whereas criminal intelligence forms a pool of information which is primarily a source for reactive investigation of crime and occasionally for more proactive planning, intelligence about serious organised crime and terrorism is thought of primarily in terms of proactive enforcement, opportunity reduction, disruption and prevention (Innes and Sheptycki 2004; McCulloch and Wilson 2016; Tilley 2016). Organised crime and terrorism intelligence are obviously similar in that both involve a high degree of presumed violence, threat and danger, but these foci differ from each other because the primary locus of the former concerns illicit market activity and the latter concerns politically motivated activity. Consequently the lens used to scope these activities is different in significant respects.

These four foci of police intelligence – criminal intelligence, public order intelligence, serious and organised crime intelligence and counter-terrorism intelligence – are closely oriented to the police métier which, as already discussed, is defined as a professional line involving specialist abilities in the orchestration of surveillance and coercive power in the governance of crime, disorder and insecurity. The other three intelligence foci designated here operate at different degrees of variance in
orientation to the police métier. So-called ‘community intelligence’ is based on a wide variety of informational sources and is not necessarily related only to the occurrence of crime and instances or locations of public disorder. Thinking within the police métier, community intelligence can provide useful clues, for example, if focused through the lenses of serious and organised crime or counter-terrorism analysis (Bayer 2010, p. 21–22, Delpeuch and Ross 2016). On the other hand, community and problem oriented policing prescribes a social crime prevention focus on community intelligence that aims to alter the circumstances productive of crime and disorder in the first instance (Ekblom 2003; Mouhanna 2008; Punch et al. 2008; Bullock 2013, 2014; Leighton 2016). Community intelligence can be focused on community capacity building, but doing so is tangential to the police métier (Skogan 2016). External audiences can regard the gathering of community intelligence in a variable light – ranging from demanding of service, grudging acceptance of presence, to not-so-welcome resentment to out-right hostile reception (Edwards and Hughes 2005; Hughes and Rowe 2007). Because community intelligence may be pursued in tandem with other intelligence foci and because some preoccupations of this lens do not necessarily clearly focus the police métier an aura of ambivalence surrounds it and this is true for both internal and external actors.

Multi-agency co-ordination intelligence is another foci which features a certain degree of variance with the police métier. In some contexts, multiple agencies from the police sector may be involved in joint operations or task forces. In other contexts multi-agency co-ordination intelligence involves working with non-police agencies. In either instance, multi-agency intelligence co-ordination can involve both private and public agencies. In all instances, when the multi-agency co-ordination intelligence lens is in use there are trust issues around information sharing between actors internal and external to the police métier (Aden 2016). Intrinsically, all constituent units in a given police organisation will have some concern with the ability to co-ordinate with other units (Giacomantonio 2015). Therefore multi-agency co-ordination intelligence is integral to police organisation but vacillating in orientation to the police métier.

The seventh and final foci concerns managerial and business intelligence which is at variance with the police métier because, although it aims at the strategic and, to a lesser extent, tactical management of police resources, the language of management draws heavily on the métier of the Business School and of new public sector management. In principle aimed at the efficient and effective management of police capacity, there can be discrepancies between the optimal view focused as managerial and business intelligence and other intelligence foci. For example, internal police threat assessments regarding the relative harm posed by different identifiable groups participating in illicit economic activity can be at variance with efficiency and effectiveness criteria used to evaluate the deployment of police resources. As a consequence proactive operational projects can end up focusing on the easy targets rather than the more difficult to get at but more socially harmful activities of other groups. Another example might be community intelligence gathering, where the efficacy of using information and police knowledge to contribute to community capacity building is undermined by quantitative metrics that measure street level enforcement activity. Yet another example could be management metrics for traffic policing that focus on issuing traffic citations and thereby obscure thinking about affecting road safety through environmental design.

These seven foci of police intelligence are different cognitive lenses that define police ‘knowledge work’ and make sense of the division of expert knowledge that comprises the police intelligence division-of-labour (cf. Haggerty and Ericson 2000; Ericson 1994). These lenses are affected by positioning within the police division-of-labour and the use of different intelligence foci are analytically distinct but may be practically intertwined. For example, general investigators who are normally interested in criminal intelligence having to do with volume crimes like assault, theft and robbery, may co-ordinate with a CRU in a multi-agency project affecting instances of vandalism in a particular area. In such an instance, investigative intelligence, community intelligence and multi-agency co-ordination intelligence foci may all be deployed in different positions within the police division-of-labour in the orchestration of operations. Observations about information boundaries and connections between
and across units that constitute the typical urban police service are revealed as plural and complex and yet they attain coherence relative to the police métier.

**Location and function of intelligence foci in the police division-of-labour**

Table 2 classifies the police intelligence division-of-labour according to an analytical grid formed by the intersection of various roles within the police division-of-labour with the variety of intelligence foci. Institutionally speaking in an abstract sense there are four relevant activities: the acquisition (q) of intelligence or information; the analysis (an) of information in the production of intelligence; tasking and co-ordination (ta/co) on the basis of intelligence ‘product’; or being operationally tasked (op/ta) on that same basis (Ratcliffe and Sheptycki 2009). These four activities are largely oriented with respect to the underlying logic of the police métier. There are different ways which the acquisition of intelligence can be undertaken, depending on position and role. For example, traffic enforcement units acquire intelligence through high volume license plate checks and special patrol units do the same by using street identity checks. On the other hand special investigations units and the intelligence bureau may, between them, compete over (and thereby confound) the acquisition of investigative intelligence and thereby distort the strategic intelligence analysis. Analysis is supposed to form the basis of decision-making in the operational tasking of units. Since PRUs are considered the ‘backbone’ of the archetypal urban police service, it is especially interesting to see how this role is configured by the demands of intelligence-led policing.

Scanning across the top row of the table shows the ‘front line’ PRUs. These units are often very busy answering to calls for service dispatched centrally. In this respect, such units are operationally tasked through intelligence and information processes. During down time, when not involved in primary response such units may be tasked with responsibility to acquire information suitable for entry on to police databases that could be put to other uses, for example identity checks and vehicle license checks may be subject to geo-temporal analysis useful in operationally tasking operational support units such as a special patrol group (SPG). When it comes to public order intelligence, PRUs are more often tasked by system information demands than they are involved in information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location and Function of Intelligence</th>
<th>Primary Response Units</th>
<th>Community &amp; Neighbourhood Patrol Units</th>
<th>Traffic Patrol Units</th>
<th>General Investigative Units</th>
<th>Specialist Investigation units</th>
<th>Intelligence Bureau</th>
<th>Operational Support Units</th>
<th>Central Management &amp; Administration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>q; op/ta</td>
<td>q; op/ta</td>
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<td>q; op/ta</td>
<td>q; an</td>
<td>q; an; ta/co</td>
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<td>q; op/ta</td>
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<td>q; an; ta/co</td>
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<td>q; an; ta/co</td>
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Notes: q: acquisition of intelligence/information; ta/co: tasking & co-ordination; an: analysis; op/ta: operationally tasked with intelligence.
acquisition. Nonetheless, such units may be involved in gathering public order intelligence and, with the variety of technological aids to hand increasingly relay important information ‘in real time’. PRUs may be operationally tasked on the basis of intelligence analysis involving serious and organised crime, counter-terrorism and community safety intelligence, but are rarely involved in intelligence acquisition focused specifically along these lines. Similarly, these units may be tasked on the basis of multi-agency co-ordination intelligence, but are not primarily involved in its production and are not considered useful repositories of such knowledge themselves. In terms of managerial and business intelligence, these units are managed on the basis of a number of key performance indicators, based on the expectations of the police métier; that is to say having to do with enforcement outcomes. Response times and occurrence resolutions are all subject to recording rules for the purposes of management. Studies of front-line police patrol reveal PRUs to be subject to the vagaries of computer-aided command-and-control systems and, apart from easing behaviour, there is very little discretion (Mastrofski 2005; Sanders and Hannem 2012).

Urban police agencies may differ in the organisational capacity put into primary response to citizen calls for service. Scanning across the second row of Table 2, in some police services, policework can take the form of community and neighbourhood teams (Edwards and Hughes 2005; Hughes and Rowe 2007; Gauthier 2016; Leighton 2016). In some versions the primary raison d'être of community officers is the acquisition, analysis, and tasking and co-ordination of multi-agency responses involving health (including mental health), education, social welfare and public housing all on the basis of community safety intelligence (Cockbain and Knutson 2013; Tilley 2013; Skogan 2016). In this event the convergent intersection of the CRU with a comprehensive community intelligence and multi-agency co-ordination intelligence foci could produce a self-tasking local area police and community safety partnership or a community security hub (Edwards and Hughes 2005; Bullock 2014). There are dangers. The external sharing of police information about crime and community safety can have perceived negative effects, for example, undermining property values (Barker 2016). In practice, the modus operandi of community policing is at variance with the police métier and, in any case, these capacities are being increasingly absorbed into counter-terrorism and serious organised crime intelligence acquisition (Murphy 2007; Klausen 2009). CRUs can be tasked with acquiring information and intelligence for other purposes, for example, in helping to acquire criminal investigative or public order intelligence, or organised crime and counter-terrorism intelligence. This position in the police division-of-labour involves multi-agency co-ordination intelligence work and boundary maintenance, because it often concerns work with non-police agencies. Officers in these positions act as conduits of information into the policing information environment and may selectively share police information with outside partners. Relevant managerial and business intelligence concerning the activities of those positioned in this part of the police division-of-labour is often project based. Community officers develop project plans, execute and evaluate them providing data for management purposes. Since community safety is reflected in the absence of indicators of crime and public disorder, it is often difficult for officers in these positions to produce management intelligence in direct concurrence with the police métier. Their greatest utility, from the point of view of police organisation, is the ability to acquire a broad range of information from different outside organisations, institutions and groups in the police task environment.

A typical multi-functional police agency will often undertake road traffic safety enforcement. In agencies of sufficient size this function can be consigned to specialists in the division-of-labour. Road traffic enforcement can be an end in itself but it can also be a pretext for intelligence acquisition in relation to other matters (Ingram 2007). Impaired driving stop checks deter drunk driving and associated license plate check data can be geo-temporally coded and put to other uses. The public order intelligence focus comes to bear when traffic units are tasked on a strategic basis in order to manage road congestion during parades, demonstrations and other large-scale events. When it comes to serious and organised crime intelligence and counter-terrorism intelligence foci, traffic units can have some peripheral involvement. For example, the rules of the road can provide pretexts for stopping vehicles and this can be useful in terms of acquiring relevant intelligence or
information, or non-traffic enforcement outcomes (such as arrest for possession of narcotics) can occur. Seen through the lens of managerial and business intelligence, these units are primarily subject to key performance indicators relating to traffic citations for example: driving without a license or while impaired, speeding or distracted driving. Traffic policing could contribute to significantly to community safety if its allied intelligence processes for acquisition and analysis produced tasking requirements for the enhancement of road safety through environmental design; instead of which this role is harnessed to metrics that emphasise operational tasking for enforcement alone.

Investigative units are considered fundamental to the police division-of-labour. Traditionally, this role has been concerned with ‘high volume’ crime such as assault, theft and robbery. In matters related to criminal intelligence, investigative detectives both acquire and analyse information and they do so primarily in order to make cases and undertake arrests. A focus on public order intelligence analysis can operationally task investigative operations, for example concerning open-air drug and prostitution markets which impact community quality of life matters. Generalist investigative work is usually institutionally separate from serious and organised crime or counter-terrorism intelligence as well as the work of special units such as the ‘vice squad’, ‘drug squad’, ‘hold-up squad’. The focus of the managerial and business intelligence lens on this aspect of the police division-of-labour reveals a central concern with clearing cases regarding relatively minor occurrences of theft, damage to property and violence. Measures of effectiveness are understood in terms of the rise and fall of criminal incidents in relation to numbers of arrests.

For a variety of historical reasons, most police agencies retain cadres of specialist detectives formed into squads which are a major source of idiosyncrasy in the organisation of policing (Manning 1980, 1997, 2016). Homicide, armed robbery, guns and gangs, drugs and vice, and now ‘cybercrime’ offer some of the major pretexts for the formation and retention of specialist investigative units. These positions are covalent with the police métier and consequently high status within the occupation. Such units are distinguished by their active and systematic approach to intelligence gathering marked by a specific investigative focus. In the case of specialist homicide and armed robbery units, the work is reactive: occurrences are translated by detectives into criminal incidents upon which they then try to build into cases. In the case of specialist anti-gang and drug units, work is often proactive: through the intensive use of surveillance teams, these squads gather information on particular individuals and groups for the purposes of criminal prosecution, frequently using organised crime and criminal conspiracy laws to do so. Such units are notorious hoarders of intelligence, because monopoly knowledge protects institutional turf. In some jurisdictions police services have created specialist units in response to political crime. For example, the development of Special Branch in the UK in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was a response to the so-called Irish question. A focus on multi-agency co-ordination intelligence reveals tensions around this role, where external security agencies compete with nascent or existing specialist political crime units for operational tasking responsibility in relation to counter-terrorism. Special squads may also seek to acquire intelligence from and about the community or communities in their task environment so as to analyse and plan for tasking in operations and projects. Especially when it involves information sharing for proactive covert surveillance, multi-agency co-ordination intelligence work is highly circumscribed and is less about information sharing than it is intelligence acquisition. Managerial and business intelligence concerning the operation of special squads is concerned with project costs (e.g. measured in over-time pay) as against the value of making high-profile cases or achieving other markers of success. Sufficiently oriented to specialist investigative functions regarded as essential to the police métier, these high status units exhibit a relatively high degree of discretionary activity (Manning 1980, 1997; Hobbs 1988; Marx and Fijnaut 1995; Billingsley et al. 2001). This self-tasking and specialisation is at odds with some theories of intelligence-led policing which stress centralisation of strategic intelligence for the purposes of tasking and co-ordination (James 2013).

Intelligence bureaus, acting as general repositories for system-wide analytical capability, are seen to be increasingly important in the orchestration of the police intelligence division-of-labour. These
are places where all manner of acquired information can be collated, filed and formatted – in short *analysed* – forming the basis for co-ordinated strategic and tactical operational tasking. As indicated in Table 1, a distinction between operational and analytical intelligence can be drawn. The former is concerned with different modes of intelligence acquisition. This includes mobile surveillance teams, electronic and cyber surveillance, informant handling and covert police operations. There is a significant overlap with the intelligence acquisition work of some special squads (Dunnighan and Norris 1999; Billingsley et al. 2001; James 2013; Manning 2016). In new and innovative areas of police work – for example, with regard to sexual offences with an ‘on-line’ or ‘cyber’ element, human trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation, or counter-terrorism and political crime – sometimes intelligence bureaus have taken responsibility, preempting the formation of new special squads or absorbing existing ones. A difficulty is that such bureaus often do not have the operational capacity to undertake enforcement operations and affect arrests and therefore must task and co-ordinate other units in order to do so. Scanning across the relevant row in Table 2, it can be seen that the ideal-typical Intelligence Bureau works to acquire and analyse relevant data, information and knowledge across six of the seven foci and on that basis aim to task and co-ordinate the work of other units. The practical limits of data warehousing are mitigated by the ambit of the police *métier* and the habits of specific organisations. Operational role differences are revealed in the varied orientations to the intelligence division-of-labour and sometimes organisational rivalries are observed (Manning 2016). Intelligence bureaus normally work with information that is intelligence. Special squads traditionally work with information that may become evidence. Moreover, special squads have the ability to mount enforcement operations, whereas the Intelligence Bureau typically does not. Disruption techniques are based on intelligence (Innes and Sheptycki 2004; Tilley 2016) and inter- and intra-organisational multi-agency collaboration intelligence may involve the production of evidence so there is a constant need to manage the evidence-intelligence boundary. Intelligence bureaus produce threat assessments and a variety of intelligence products for tasking and co-ordination of other units. Threat assessments with a projected internal career guide resource allocation decisions in operational planning. Threat assessments with a projected external career are intended to affect the perceptions of outside audiences. Risk assessments consider possible negative consequences for the organisation in the event of project failure. Intelligence Bureaus can potentially monopolise intelligence operations and analysis and, through tasking and co-ordination routines, thereby seek to exercise control of other units. If intelligence bureaus also have direct control of operational enforcement means they could be fully self-tasking and in that event are potentially a ‘firm within a firm’. Seen through the lens of managerial and business intelligence, the routine work of such centres is unquantifiable. Management evaluation is based on project outcomes and as long as there are no misadventures, such units are largely inviolable. It is now difficult to imagine a multi-functional police organisation that did not have facilities for managing large police databases, undertaking analytical work, formulating threat and risk assessments and recommending alternative operational plans.

There are a variety of operational support units in different police services. Common examples are K9 and mounted units, marine and aerial units, emergency response teams (i.e. ‘SWAT’ units), SPGs and riot squads. In virtually all instances, operational support teams are tasked on the basis of intelligence filtered through one or another of the intelligence foci. For example, mounted units can be deployed in the context of community policing or public order operations. Dog handlers and aerial reconnaissance units can be tasked to gather either evidence or intelligence. Where they exist, marine units serve multiple functions inclusive of primary response, traffic control and police community patrol on rivers, lakes and waterways and have similar relations to the police intelligence division-of-labour as does land-based front-line policing. Operational support units – the SPG (which are hand-picked units of uniformed patrol officers trained to undertake intensive field operations), the riot squad (trained to for large-scale public order events) and the emergency task force (ETF who are trained in special weapons and tactics), or specialists in VIP ‘close protection’ and bomb disposal – all offer gradations in orientation to the police *métier*. Often important symbols of
police organisational potency, units like the mounted section (which reflect tradition and, hence, legitimacy) and the aerial surveillance unit (ensuring order with ‘eyes in the sky’) are difficult to subject to managerial and business intelligence solutions. Officers who deploy in many of these specialist units, often only do so on a part-time, ‘as need’ basis and normally fulfil work commitments in other roles.

The managerial and business intelligence lens is the last line of consideration in the police division-of-labour. As can be seen in Table 2, in ideal-typical terms, managerial and business intelligence does not intake information using any of the intelligence foci already enumerated. Managerial intelligence analysis is divorced from criminal intelligence and public order intelligence analyses, as it is from the details of serious and organised crime, counter-terrorism and community policing. Business analytics operate at a distance from the police métier. The metrics for business and managerial intelligence analysis do not concern the ‘dirty details’ of operational police information. For example, it is possible to know the fuel bills and over-time costs for mobile covert surveillance in a given context without knowing the operational details subsequent to the legal warrant authorising the operation. Business and managerial intelligence units have access to organisational systems data for the purposes of analysis and assessment of agency efficiency, effectiveness and economy. Strategic decisions about organisational tasking, co-ordination and resource allocation are made on the basis of business intelligence analysis. Occasionally, management units may undertake community surveys gathering information on community issues for the purposes of gauging police legitimacy, but these are not usually considered to be sources of operationally useful community intelligence. Administration in police organisations tends also to assume responsibility for a number of ancillary intelligence roles, in addition to things like archiving records concerning human resource allocation, quality assurance business and corporate planning – for example: corporate communications, legal and media relations and facilitation of freedom of information requests. In some of the larger police organisations, a ‘real time operations centre’ (RTOC) exists and is co-located within the administration offices. In the future these intelligence hubs will commonly operate on the basis of streams of data focused through the complete panoply of intelligence foci in ‘real time’ potentially enabling full spectrum direct strategic and tactical supervision of front-line uniformed patrol and detectives. Managerial intelligence can distort the police intelligence division-of-labour because economic criteria systematically misrepresent organisational goals pursued through other intelligence foci and are therefore a poor source of information to support the democratic governance of the urban police organisation.

**Discussion and conclusion**

It is seldom the case that researchers find themselves doing research inside a police organisation that is not in the midst of ‘transformational change’. Every police organisation I have ever studied is either in the midst of an operational review, about to undertake a re-organisation based on one, or re-organisation has recently taken place. As the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus said, ‘ever-newer waters flow on those who step into the same rivers’ (Warner 1958, p. 26). The question is, how to picture the river? The previous discussion is the result of an attempt to derive, by the processes of analytical induction, a theoretical picture of the endlessly transforming police intelligence division-of-labour of the typical contemporary urban police service. Accordingly analytical distinctions concerning the police division-of-labour and a variety of intelligence foci provide an analytical grid for describing the police intelligence division-of-labour. The analysis argued further that this picture gains organisational coherence relative to the police métier. The model should be broadly reflective of the situation in Europe, North America and the UK and is useful for comparative purposes and for understanding the interconnections that make up discrete roles that comprise the police organisation as a whole. However, it is an abstraction and its usefulness is chiefly that it provokes future research and thinking. The need for insight is especially acute in matters regarding democratic oversight of police and security governance.
Table 2 reveals that some positions in the police intelligence division-of-labour exhibit wide discretion while others exhibit relatively narrow discretion. This adds substantial complexity to the classic picture of police organisations as being characterised by high discretion afforded by the increasing ‘low visibility of decision-making’ as one moves ‘down the hierarchy’ (Goldstein 1960; Skolnick 1967; Wilson 1968). In this model there is no hierarchy. Instead, the (often unspoken) logic of the police métier is operationalised by performing a variety of specifiable roles within a complex division-of-labour rationalised according to the concurrent preoccupations of several different intelligence lenses and it is in this sense that the archetypal municipal police service can be said to be organised. A key feature of the police intelligence division-of-labour appears to be the management of the boundary between internally circulated information and intelligence, and evidence. The later has a projected external career. The boundary between internal and external knowledge is in continual negotiation with respect to the multi-agency co-ordination intelligence focus, but certain positions within the division-of-labour are expressly concerned with such boundaries, albeit in different ways. Investigative units think differently about the boundaries between internally circulated intelligence and externally released evidence than does the CRU or the media relations department. CRUs and PRUs are more or less oriented to pole star of the police métier and the former inevitably play a complicated game with respect to acquiring community intelligence and disseminating police information to the outside world. This complex picture of the police intelligence division-of-labour raises interesting challenges for democratic governance and adds nuance to our understanding of the politics of police surveillance and visibility (Ericson and Haggerty 2005).

The analytical grid used here to describe the police intelligence division-of-labour reveals the informational dissociation of managerial and business intelligence from all other intelligence foci. Organisational information ‘stove-piping’ is usually thought of negatively in relation to the hoarding of intelligence by special squads, or by specific operational intelligence focus (say to do with ‘organised crime’ or ‘terrorism’), but with managerial intelligence the stove pipe effect is system wide. The entire police division-of-labour is subject to comprehensive surveillance in the service of acquiring management knowledge by which to strategically task and co-ordinate the organisation according to a business logic disaffiliated from the police métier. This view of the police intelligence division-of-labour adds complexity to the long ago observed gap between ‘street cops’ and ‘management cops’ (Reuss-Ianni 1983; Chan 2001). These structural conditions help to explain the persistent problems of governing policing by numbers and targets (Young 1991; Perrin 1998; Maguire 2000; Fassin 2011; de Maillard and Mouhanna 2016) and partly explain the importunate organisational pathologies that plague police intelligence systems (Sheptycki 2004). Existing research suggests that the development of RTOCs will likely reinforce organisational pretensions to the rationality of organisational ‘chain of command’ (Weisburd et al. 2003; Mastrofski 2005, 2007; McCue 2014). The organisational domination of managerial and business intelligence over the police division-of-labour focuses on the improvement of artificial metrics of police accountability and again raises complex questions about democratic police governance, especially in a period where the economics of policing are dominated by neo-liberal thinking (Sanders and Sheptycki 2016).

This theoretical picture of the police intelligence division-of-labour is not a machine model. It is a schema for understanding the positioning of people in relation to the police métier, which is here defined broadly with reference to the professional craft knowledge concerning the means of surveillance and coercion in making crime, reproducing order and governing insecurity. Within this schema individual people occupy identifiable positions and adjust their work routines, recipes, rituals and roles with regard to the inter-organisational uses that different kinds of information and intelligence propose. Those individual adjustments are based on rationally self-interested calculations and personal considerations that are shaped by situationally conditioned perceptions within the intelligence division-of-labour oriented to the police métier. The police intelligence division-of-labour is designed to limit and facilitate access to information on a ‘need to know’ basis, but different positions in the schema give greater or lesser strategic access to different kinds of information and individual discretion is thereby shaped and limited in different ways. The structure of these informational relations,
both formal and informal, is the seedbed of human organisational politics the irrationality of which is one of the primary reasons why police institutions are not simple bureaucratic machines (Sheptycki 2017).

This analysis suggests how to begin to explore the ways in which ‘the police’ configure in broader networks of security governance. The police métier encourages the conservation and strictly limited application of police power to undertake surveillance and utilise coercive power and all organisational resources are bent to the task of facilitating this. There are a striking number of one-way intelligence channels by which police organisations filter selected knowledge to outside audiences. Intelligence and information acquisition similarly goes on through multiple channels. Information sharing straddles boundaries within the division-of-labour and generally the outcome of analysis is a reflection of the police métier. Police-to-police intra-agency sharing of information is different that sharing with non-police agencies because of fundamental differences in orientation to the police métier as either ‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’. Multi-agency co-ordination intelligence processes facilitate knowledge about, and exchange with, security network partners. Any resulting selective interpel-lation of the police métier into institutionalised collaborations of security governance is an ideological move by police agents that imbues governance with the stamp of authority.

Notes


2. The term ‘interpellation’ is familiar in French political theory and is etymological derived from the Latin interpel-latio, meaning to arrest or interrupt. Interpellation infers the act of control by means of the power of arrest and it also gestures at the image of a judicial demand to do or say something. In French political theory the term has sometimes been used to indicate an ideological and practical process by which people are subject to police power (Rancière et al. 2001).

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