

# 10

## SOLIDARITY AND SECURITY IN THE EU DISCOURSE ON AID

*Iliana Olivie and Aitor Pérez*

### Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Securitisation of aid has been addressed by the academic literature, particularly since the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, which impacted the pattern of aid allocation by the US and by a number of multilateral donors such as the World Bank. *De facto* or discursive securitisation of aid implies that donors take a defensive approach to international relations in general, and to development assistance in particular, focussing on the preservation of national interests such as ‘homeland security’. Contrary to this, however, in discourses on aid, which are based on the principle of solidarity, or on the need to build global common goods, the world beyond one’s national borders is viewed not as a source of threat, but rather as an opportunity.

The Great Recession in Europe that commenced in 2009 (and its consequences in terms of rising inequalities and the loss of confidence in formal institutions and political representation), complicated by conflicts in the Middle East, and by subsequent flows of migrants and refugees crossing (or attempting to cross) the Mediterranean Sea, has renewed the debate around aid securitisation (Miles, 2012), particularly in reference to European donors. For instance, there are rising concerns in the charity sector that a deepening of the securitisation logic might manifest an increasing proportion of refugee costs in relation to total Official Development Assistance (ODA) in countries such as Germany or Denmark.

Aid narratives are expressed through forms of communication both external (multilateral organisations, partner countries) and internal (political parties, charities, society as a whole). In the latter, persuasive discourse can be key to the survival of aid budgets, if domestic stakeholders see their interests and/or values reflected in the aid narrative. As Brown *et al.* (2016) put it: “Securitisation can be interpreted as a response to new, post-Cold War security concerns, but it can also

be seen as a discourse strategically adopted by aid proponents to justify already rising aid budgets to sceptical politicians or voters” (Brown *et al.*, 2016, p. 327). Because different groups do not necessarily share the same interests and values, coexistent and contending discourses on aid are not difficult to find.

This chapter explores the aid narrative of the European Union and, in particular, a presumed shift towards securitisation. The case of the EU is relevant for many reasons. The Union as a whole is the world’s largest donor, delivering over half of aid globally, as well as a leader in terms of both ODA funds and political impulse. Also, when compared to other Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors, the EU is (or has been) seen as a particularly constructivist donor, aimed at alleviating world poverty and building regional and global governance structures. For these reasons, a shift in the EU’s aid paradigm towards security might represent an important U-turn.

The chapter is structured as follows. The “Why do countries give aid in the first place?” section reviews the literature on aid allocation; the “Is aid being securitised, according to academic literature?” section reviews the literature on aid securitisation. The “How to define the narratives of EU aid? Methodological aspects” section poses the research problem in methodological terms: using a content analysis technique, we explore the extent to which the aid narrative (in official documents of the EU institutions, Germany, the UK, France, and the Netherlands) has shifted from a social development paradigm (targeting poverty eradication on grounds of North-South solidarity) to a sustainable development paradigm (implementing the 2030 Agenda on the basis of global common interests) and/or to a security paradigm, for the sake of donors’ national interests. The “Results: is the securitisation of the EU aid narrative a reality?” section summarises the main results, and the final section presents our conclusions.

## Why do countries give aid in the first place?

The case for aid by donor countries has been analysed by the academic literature mainly through the lens of aid disbursements: the pattern of geographical allocation of aid of a given donor shows whether rich/developed countries award resources to certain poor/developing countries, and not to others, according to their own self-interests (self-centred motives) and/or according to characteristics of the recipient country, specifically its needs or merits (altruistic motives).<sup>2</sup>

These are therefore mostly empirical studies that are, moreover, conducted from the viewpoint of the donor. This line follows a seminal work by Dudley and Montmarquette (1976), who designed a model for econometric analysis of the causes of international assistance, and by McKinley and Little (1978a, 1978b, and 1979), who analysed whether German, British, and American aid during the 1960s was given out of self-interest or in order to meet recipients’ needs. McKinley and Little concluded that motives of self-interest clearly prevailed over recipient needs, opening the door to a series of studies that have analysed the relative importance of these two sets of factors and their evolution over time.

A great many of these analyses come to the conclusion that the national interests of donors prevail when it comes to the international allocation of aid. Donor interests may be different in nature: the colonial past experience of nations (Alesina & Dollar, 2000); geographical proximity (Szent-Ivanyi, 2012); or political, security, investment, and/or trade interests – as evidenced in voting patterns at the United Nations, in donor payoffs vis-à-vis global health issues, or in the use of aid as a tool for containing migration, or for counterterrorism activities (Maizels & Nissanke, 1984; Schraeder *et al.*, 1998; Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Berthélemy, 2006; Lundsgaarde *et al.*, 2010; Szent-Ivanyi, 2012; Boutton & Carter, 2014; Bermeo & Leblang, 2015; Bermeo, 2017; Kisangani & Pickering, 2015; Heinrich *et al.*, 2017; Steele, 2017; Braun & Zagler, 2018).

This pattern also applies to humanitarian aid (Narang, 2016). Moreover, bilateral interests appear to dilute when aid is transferred via multilateral channels, according to various authors (see, for instance, Berthélemy, 2006). Other studies focus on the lack of relevance of recipient needs and/or merits as criteria for allocating international assistance (Alesina & Weder, 2002; Birdsall *et al.*, 2003; Neumayer, 2003; Hoefler & Outram, 2011; Heinrich *et al.*, 2018).

Still other studies are not quite so conclusive about the prevalence of donors' interests (or the non-prevalence of recipient needs or good governance) in the allocation of international bilateral assistance. This is the case with Mosley (2006) and Dreher *et al.* (2011) when analysing emerging donors. In that same vein, according to Petrikova (2016), emerging donors show a similar pattern to that of traditional donors when it comes to incorporating human rights into their aid decision processes. Taking another view, Isopi and Mavrotas (2006) and Clist (2011) claim that there is no uniform behaviour among donors.

More recently, a second body of literature seems to have emerged. These works introduce a more complex (and therefore more accurate and/or nuanced) view on the dynamics behind geographical distribution. Here it is assumed that a single donor (or, more precisely, various institutions or channels within that single donor) might be allocating ODA to different recipients for different reasons (Dollar & Levin, 2006; Metzger *et al.*, 2009; Dreher *et al.*, 2010; Loman *et al.*, 2011; Nunnenkamp & Öhler, 2011; Dreher *et al.*, 2012).

As for the EU, when analysing aid to Mediterranean countries, Reynaert (2011) finds that support for market-oriented reform is the main goal of such aid. Elsewhere, looking at the particular case of Vietnam, Hoang (2014) concludes that the EU supports that country for a combination of reasons, including the donor's economic and political interests and the high standards of governance shown by the recipient. According to Kim and Jensen (2018), the human rights records of potential recipients significantly predict the amount of EU aid disbursements.

In short, the literature on the motives for aid remains far from conclusive. First, various reasons may simultaneously explain the allocation pattern of the donor community as a whole, or even of a single donor. Second, reasons of security (the fight against terrorism, containment of migration flows, prevention

of conflict via support of autocratic governments) are feasible rationales among the set of political variables that can determine the volume, nature, and international allocation of aid. Third, such security concerns might also be behind the geographical pattern of EU aid, despite the fact that they coexist with 'nobler' motivations such as the human rights record of recipient countries. Fourth, given the potential for mixed motivations, and on the basis of the academic literature on aid allocation, a process of aid securitisation may be currently underway, affecting the EU both as a donor and as a global political actor.

### **Is aid being securitised, according to academic literature?**

The debate on the eventual securitisation of aid has transcended the public and political debate and is being addressed by the academic literature. The conceptual basis for securitisation lies in what has been called the security–development nexus (see, for instance, Faust & Messner, 2004; Keukeleire & Raube, 2013). If the assumption is made that security is a pre-condition for development, and if there is acceptance of the proposition that development leads to security, the natural policy response would be to interlink external security and development cooperation policies and tools. It is precisely this political interlink that opens the door to aid securitisation: there is a risk that development objectives may be crowded out by security aims in this holistic external approach (Faust & Messner, 2004).

Aid securitisation became a hot topic after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Miles, 2012; Brown *et al.*, 2016). An increasing number of academic studies on aid securitisation have been published in the last couple of decades, and several of these focus precisely on the EU as a global political actor. Such is the case with Furness and Ganzle (2016), who explore the securitisation of EU external action at three different levels: (1) the aid discourse, (2) the institutional setting, and (3) and the Union's aid allocation. At the discourse level, they sum up the contents of a series of institutional documents and political statements and come to the conclusion that the development–security nexus is increasingly present in the EU narrative (although this may not necessarily mean a securitisation of aid). In that same vein, and also referring specifically to the EU, Keukeleire and Raube (2013) observe the securitisation of EU development policy through four lenses: (1) the discourse; (2) policy instruments; (3) policy action; and (4) institutional frameworks. As regards the discourse, in line with Furness and Ganzle (2016), the authors here summarise the contents of key institutional EU documents and come to similar conclusions. Orbie and Del Biondo (2015) explore whether EU aid to Chad has been securitised, and they conclude that it has not. Although democratic governance tools of the EU were indeed contaminated by security concerns, development cooperation and humanitarian aid appear not to have been.

Brown *et al.* (2016) gather the conclusions of a collective book on the securitisation of foreign aid that examines major donors (the US, the UK, Japan, France, Canada), including the EU. Following a similar methodological path as the above-mentioned studies, they observe a trend towards securitisation of aid

that manifests in changing patterns of (1) the aid discourse; (2) aid allocation; and (3) institutional aid arrangements. Securitisation of aid would also figure in the displacement of other development agendas, such as that around issues of gender.

In all of the mentioned cases, research techniques are based on the authors' summaries and interpretations of official documents, bolstered by semi-structured interviews. One study by Petrikova and Lazell (2017) conducts qualitative discourse analysis of official documents. Their study focusses on multilateral agents (more precisely, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the European Commission, and the World Bank), codifying official texts such as World Bank's World Development Reports. They come to the conclusion that within the development policy discourse, the approach to conflict-affected states consists of two interrelated assumptions. The first is that underdevelopment and conflict in the global South are mutually reinforcing, and that there can be no security without development, and vice versa. The second assumption guiding all three institutions is that development aid can be used to enhance security and to prevent conflict in the global South.

Previous studies on this topic indicate episodes of securitisation. However, several questions remain unanswered, and some debates remain open. First, although different studies have analysed the EU as a donor from the perspective of securitisation, the research techniques applied (authors' summaries and interpretations of official documents) rely heavily on the analysts' own perceptions and criteria. In this sense, it might be useful to employ a standardised technique of content analysis, in a similar vein to that of Petrikova and Lazell (2017). Second, although several articles point to the 9/11 terrorist attacks as the trigger of aid securitisation, in the case of Europe, other more relevant triggers may also pertain. There is a general perception that the Great Recession of 2009 and its consequences (increases in inequalities, lack of confidence in official institutions and political representation, lower profile of the international agenda in relation to domestic issues, etc.), along with conflicts in the Middle East and their impact on migration flows and refugees, might well have been more important factors for Europe than the 2001 terrorist attacks. Third, the documents reviewed in this section offer snapshots. If the question is the extent to which the aid discourse is being securitised, then we are referring to an evolving process, and the narrative needs to be explored across several years. Fourth, the trend towards securitisation is necessarily a narrative journey – a departure from some other aid concepts or motives. In this sense, it could be revealing to explore the shift from the paradigm of social development.

## **How to define the narratives of EU aid? Methodological aspects**

### ***Who or what is Europe as a donor?***

EU development cooperation is the result of both bilateral programmes by EU member states and non-EU multilateral programmes, as well as member states'

contributions to EU institutions that are channelled to third countries as Official Development Assistance (ODA). These EU institutions (such as the European Commission or the European Investment Bank) act as an additional donor in the sense that they, too, have political priorities, as well as a pattern of geographical and sectorial distribution of aid. Moreover, given the significant share of funds channelled through EU institutions, these also represent a relevant European (and world) donor.

One way of exploring an eventual shift in the narrative of EU aid would be to dig into this narrative for all 28 member states, plus that of EU institutions. However, the EU comprises donors of very different sizes. ‘Big’ donors are those larger countries (in economic and demographic terms) that deliver higher volumes of ODA, and whose narrative might have a stronger impact, both in the global development system and in shaping the discourse and behaviour of EU institutions. Therefore, analysis of the discourse of a selection of relevant donors might result in a fairly precise idea of where EU aid is headed overall.

According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) figures, the top eight EU donors by volume of disbursement throughout the 2000–2017 period were Germany, the EU institutions, the UK, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Italy, and Spain. These seven member states account for over 84% of total ODA channelled from EU countries and institutions in this period. Therefore, there is a strong concentration of aid in a small number of donors, and this manifests in the fact that the top five donors (Germany, the EU institutions, the UK, France, and the Netherlands) together deliver 86% of total EU aid. When limiting EU aid to that of the top member state donors (Germany, the UK, France, and the Netherlands – excluding that of supra-national institutions), this share represents 66% of total aid disbursed by member states. Thus, it could be said that analysis of these four countries’ narratives might give us a good sense of the overall European discourse of international cooperation.

Moreover, these four donors all happen to be strongly committed to aid policy. Still, the fact that a country delivers a high proportion of aid might be related to its size, but it does not necessarily imply that the volume represents a relevant part of their domestic economy. For instance, in the non-EU cases of the US, Japan, and China – all of them big aid players on the global scene – disbursed aid does not represent an important share of the national budget. This is not, however, the case for Germany, the UK, France, or the Netherlands, all of which support aid budgets that are above the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) average in relation to the sizes of their economies. Germany’s and the Netherlands’ aid budget are at 0.61% of their Gross National Income (GNI), therefore doubling the DAC average. The British aid budget is even higher (0.7% of GNI). The French budget (0.43% of its domestic economy) is below that level, but still well above the DAC average (Table 10.1).

**TABLE 10.1** ODA budgets of major EU member state donors

	<i>ODA in volume (millions of current US\$)*</i>	<i>ODA as % of GNI (in 2018)</i>
Germany	227,023	0.61
UK	216,618	0.70
France	173,423	0.43
Netherlands	92,914	0.61
Total EU (excluding EU institutions)	1,074,618	
DAC average		0.31

Source: OECD and authors' calculations.

\* Total, 2000–2017 period.

In short, Germany, the UK, France, and the Netherlands are the most relevant European donors in the sense that they together deliver 66% of total aid channelled by EU member states. We can thus infer that these are likewise the most relevant political actors in terms of shaping the aid discourse in Europe. Moreover, they are committed donors, indicating that aid is a non-negligible aspect of domestic politics in these four countries. We can therefore further assume that their aid narratives represent important communication tools with their own domestic societies.

### ***What should we be analysing?***

As in previous studies on this same topic, we now explore the aforementioned aid narratives present in political and official documents (more precisely, in the key strategic and/or planning documents of international development cooperation). Identification of these documents can be conducted via the DAC peer review, a mechanism established by the OECD. Periodically, a given DAC donor is evaluated by two peers from the same group, and the publications that synthesise these evaluations identify the key strategic documents guiding the donor's aid policy (Table 10.2).

As noted, we intend to explore the extent to which the aid discourse has evolved as a result of the recent economic crisis and the ongoing refugee and migrant crises. For each donor, we found it necessary to select two strategic documents: one pre-dating the economic crisis and one from the post-crisis period. The shifting concept of aid is expected to represent a departure from a previous paradigm – in this instance, the pre-existing paradigm of social development, summarised in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) approved in 2001, and echoed in national development cooperation strategies of the early 2000s. For each donor, we have chosen one strategic document from the early 2000s and another more recent one, preferably published after 2013 (Table 10.2).

**TABLE 10.2** Key EU aid strategic documents

Germany	Charter for the Future – One World, Our Responsibility, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2014. Poverty Reduction – a Global Responsibility. Program of Action 2015, The German Government’s Contribution toward Halving Extreme Poverty Worldwide, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2001.
UK	UK Aid: Tackling Global Challenges in the National Interest, HM Treasury, Department for International Development, 2015. Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor. White Paper on International Development, Department for International Development, 2000.
France	Comité Interministériel de la Coopération Internationale et du Développement (CICID). Relevé de conclusions, 2018. Relevé de conclusions du Comité Interministériel de la Coopération Internationale et du développement (CICID), 2002.
Netherlands	A World to Gain: A New Agenda for Aid, Trade and Investment, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2013 Mutual Interests, Mutual Responsibilities Dutch Development Cooperation en Route to 2015, Directorate-General for International Cooperation, 2003.

*Source:* Authors’ elaboration.

Moreover, it could be argued that the EU’s overall strategic approach to development is synthesised in the Consensus and the New Consensus on Development (EU, 2005 and 2017). These documents might serve as guidelines for the behaviour of the EU institutions as donors; above all, they are the result of long-term negotiations involving member states as well as EU institutions. In this sense, these are likely the texts that best reflect the ‘feeling’ of the EU as a group, beyond the very important ideological differences among the various states (on aid, but also in general).

Using a technique similar to that of Petrikova and Lazell (2017), and in order to prevent the text analysis from becoming a personalised reading, we have coded these ten selected texts. Our approach is slightly different from Petrikova and Lazell’s in the sense that we are not looking for relations between concepts (for instance, between security and development), but rather exploring the prevalence of certain ideas in relation to others. More specifically, we seek in these texts evidence of the extent to which the social development paradigm (synthesised in the MDG agenda, in force between 2000 and 2015) has evolved into its own ‘natural successor’, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), approved in 2015; or else the extent to which it has shifted towards a security agenda now affecting EU development cooperation. It is therefore necessary to establish a series of codes corresponding to each of these three paradigms (Table 10.3).



**TABLE 10.3** Paradigms of development and families of codes

1	Social development agenda or paradigm	2	Sustainable development agenda or paradigm	3	Security agenda or paradigm
1.1	Poverty / Poverty eradication	2.1	Economic development / Job creation / Decent work	3.1	Terrorism / Counter-terrorism / Radicalisation
1.2	Hunger / Food security / Malnutrition	2.2	Political rights / Human rights / Governance	3.2	Migration / Border control / Mobility / Refugees / Displacements
1.3	Gender	2.3	Environmental sustainability / Climate change	3.3	Failed or fragile states or countries
1.4	Education	2.4	Equity / Inequality	3.4	Conflict / Conflict prevention / Post-conflict intervention
1.5	Health			3.5	Stability / Instability

Source: Authors' elaboration.

It can be said that some objectives and goals belong to more than one agenda. For instance, the fight against hunger was part of the MDGs (paradigm 1), but is also included in the SDGs (paradigm 2). Likewise, peace can be considered an aspect of security (paradigm 3), but it is also SDG number 16 (paradigm 2). By establishing families of codes, our aim is to seize the key ideas that define them. The MDGs were largely an agenda of social development (1), where donors were expected to focus on poverty (1.1), hunger (1.2), gender (1.3), education (1.4), and health (1.5). Although the MDGs also included environmental targets, it was not until approval of the SDGs that the environmental and climate change agenda (2.3) became an essential (perhaps the most important) part of the global development agenda.

Unlike the MDGs, this paradigm of sustainable development (2) is also characterised by the fact that it acknowledges the complex nature of development processes, not limited to their social facet. The social dimension of development goes hand-in-hand, necessarily, with economic development – interpreted in this paradigm as a process of sustained and sustainable development leading to the creation of decent work (2.1) – and with political development (2.2). The SDGs are also recognised by their emphasis on inequality (2.4) (Sachs, 2012; Le Blanc, 2015).

Lastly, as regards the security paradigm (3), this assembles certain key concepts previously defined by the academic literature reviewed above: concepts of terrorism and radicalisation (3.1), migrations and refugees (3.2), failed or fragile states

(3.3), conflicts and their prevention (3.4), and stability (3.5) (Orbie & Del Bianco, Brown *et al.*, 2016; Furness & Ganzle, 2016).<sup>3</sup>

Apart from the general objectives or paradigms of development, donors' strategic texts generally indicate motives for aid that could be somehow linked to either altruistic or selfish sets of motives, as identified by the academic literature (see the "Why do countries give aid in the first place?" section of this chapter).

In this sense, the paradigm of social development responds, in general terms, to a North–South logic where donors (usually in the global North) have a moral responsibility, a legal obligation, and/or a feeling of solidarity towards the global South (code 4: solidarity / moral obligation / responsibility). This North–South logic is broken (or at least reshaped) in the sustainable development paradigm, which places stronger emphasis on global public goods (such as climate) and, therefore, on the need for collective action and efforts that lead to the fulfilment of common interests (code 5: common goods / common efforts / common interests / global public goods). As for the security paradigm, it operates under a North–South logic (similar to the social development paradigm), where international relations should aim at protecting national interests (code 6: self-help / self-interest / national interest).

Although certain motives tend to be connected to certain paradigms, they are not necessarily bound to one another (as we shall see in the particular case of the Netherlands). As a result, we have set distinct codes for these three motives that will be analysed separately in the following section.

## Results: Is the securitisation of the EU aid narrative a reality?

This question can be answered in different ways. One possible straightforward and simple approach is to explore the two EU Consensuses on Development (European Commission, 2006 and 2017), given that these were negotiated by all member states, plus the European institutions, and should therefore reflect the approach to social and sustainable development and to securitisation by the EU as a whole.

Both these texts have been coded following development paradigms (Table 10.3), as well as by way of codes on the motives of aid (codes 4–6). As a result, 125 paragraphs were labelled (62 in the first Consensus and 63 in the second). Because one paragraph or quote can be labelled with more than one code, this resulted in 300 assigned labels.

Although the New European Consensus on Development is more security-biased than the 2005 version, the increase in the proportion of references is slight – only 0.4 percentage points. Indeed, the main narrative shift is from the social development paradigm (prevalent in the MDG era) to the sustainable development paradigm (aligned with the SDG agenda); texts coded with code family 2 have increased from 38% to almost 56%, matched by an equivalent drop in the prevalence of texts coded with code family 1, which decreased from 47% to 29% (Table 10.4).

**TABLE 10.4** Development paradigms for aid in EU discourse (quotes by code, % of total coded text)

	<i>Social development paradigm</i>	<i>Sustainable development paradigm</i>	<i>Security paradigm</i>	<i>Number of quotes</i>	<i>Number of assigned labels</i>
2005 Consensus	47.1	38.0	14.9	62	121
2017 Consensus	28.8	55.9	15.3	63	170

Source: Authors' elaboration.

Note: The total record for each paradigm is the result of the sum of quotes labelled with second-level codes (for instance, 1.1) and those labelled with the more general paradigm label (for instance, 1).

The number of references to the motives of aid is comparatively very small: there are only five references to these motives in the 2005 Consensus and four in the more recent 2017 Consensus. Solidarity, responsibility, and/or moral obligation are the main reasons for aid in the EU discourse, representing three references out of every five in the 2005 text, and two out of every four in the 2017 text. In both texts, only one reference was made to common goods, common efforts, common interests, and/or global public goods as a motive for aid. Likewise, just one reference was made in each text to self-interest.

These results might appear to be counter-intuitive, according to political declarations reflected in the media by EU institution officials and political representatives of certain member states. Moreover, our results are not aligned with the conclusions of prior studies on security in the aid discourse in Europe.

The explanation for this might lie in the fact that the Consensuses on Development were the result of negotiations between all 28 member states as well as the EU institutions, reflecting highly varied political sensibilities vis-à-vis external action as a whole, and aid in particular. As a consequence, our results are likely to reflect a relatively balanced and stable narrative. In addition, these results may thus be compatible with more securitised aid narratives in certain specific EU donors.

All eight strategic texts from the top EU donors (Table 10.2) were coded with the same method used for the EU Consensuses on Development. In so doing, 705 paragraphs were labelled. As one paragraph or quote can conceivably be labelled with more than one code, this resulted in 1,224 assigned labels in total (including codes for paradigms and codes for motives).

Given the different formats and structures of these eight texts, the number of quotes per document varies greatly: from a maximum of 173 coded paragraphs (in Germany's document for the earlier period) to only 10 quotes in France's document for that same period (Table 10.5). Here again, the results are analysed as a proportion of assigned labels per document. For instance, in the case of the Netherlands, 60 paragraphs were labelled with paradigm codes in its strategic document from the first period. As different objectives can coexist within one paradigm, as well as in different paradigms, several paragraphs were labelled with more than one code. Therefore, the earlier Netherlands document includes

101 references to development paradigms scattered across its 60 paragraphs: of these, 42 refer to the social development paradigm, 40 to the sustainable development paradigm, and 19 to the security paradigm.

On average, quotes labelled with the security paradigm are now at 25.6% of the total coded text, up from 17.4% in the early 2000s. This increase in the reference to security matters in strategic aid documents comes at the expenses of the social development paradigm, which lowers its profile, from 41.5% of total quotes to 36.8% (although clearly remaining relevant) (Table 10.5). As for the sustainable development paradigm, its weight is significant in both periods. Although the sustainable development paradigm is more aligned with the current development agenda (the SDGs), its weight decreases from the first to the second period (from 41.1% of total assigned labels to 37.6%).

These results can be further reinforced by way of t-Student tests applied to the relative prevalence of the paradigm codes (Table 10.6). Although the difference between the social and sustainable development paradigms does not appear to be significant (particularly in the first period), the difference between the sustainable development paradigm and the security paradigm and between the social development paradigm and the security paradigm is very significant in both periods.

**TABLE 10.5** Development paradigms in EU member state discourses (quotes by code, % of total coded text)

<i>1st period</i>	<i>Social development paradigm</i>	<i>Number of codes</i>	<i>Sustainable development paradigm</i>	<i>Number of codes</i>	<i>Security paradigm</i>	<i>Number of codes</i>	<i>Total number of codes</i>	<i>Number of paragraphs</i>
Netherlands	41.6	42	39.6	40	18.8	19	101	60
UK	34.1	59	49.1	85	16.8	29	173	147
Germany	44.0	124	45.0	127	11.0	31	282	173
France	46.2	6	30.8	4	23.1	3	13	10
Average	41.5		41.1		17.4		-	-
Total							569	390
<i>2nd period</i>	<i>Social development paradigm</i>	<i>Number of codes</i>	<i>Sustainable development paradigm</i>	<i>Number of codes</i>	<i>Security paradigm</i>	<i>Number of codes</i>	<i>Total number of codes</i>	<i>Number of paragraphs</i>
Netherlands	38.0	63	38.0	63	24.1	40	166	86
UK	38.6	66	27.5	47	33.9	58	171	111
Germany	28.0	40	52.4	75	19.6	28	143	67
France	42.6	29	32.4	22	25.0	17	68	51
Average	36.8		37.6		25.6		-	-
Total							548	315

Source: Authors' elaboration.

Note: The total record for each paradigm is the result of the sum of quotes labelled with second-level codes (for instance, 1.1) and those labelled with the more general paradigm label (for instance, 1).

**TABLE 10.6** t-Student tests applied to the prevalence of development paradigms

	<i>Social development paradigm (period 1)</i>	<i>Sustainable development paradigm (period 1)</i>	<i>Security paradigm (period 1)</i>	<i>Social development paradigm (period 2)</i>	<i>Sustainable development paradigm (period 2)</i>
Sustainable development paradigm (period 1)	0.96256				
Security paradigm (period 1)	0.00514	0.03016			
Social development paradigm (period 2)	0.35095				
Sustainable development paradigm (period 2)		0.61048		0.93212	
Security paradigm (period 2)			0.08619	0.03034	0.24077

Source: Authors' elaboration.

Moreover, the differences in prevalence of the different paradigms across both periods are also significant, particularly in the case of our research objective, which is the security paradigm (with a t-Student factor close to zero).

Therefore, all three paradigms – social development, sustainable development, and security – coexist in the development narrative; a feature consistent with the fact that aid can be multi-purpose, as described in Chapter 2. What has changed from one period to the next is the weight of those three groups of elements in terms of the aid discourse. This coexistence is evident in both time and space: for each and every donor, all paradigms show a prevalence of at least 11.0% (the weight of the security paradigm in Germany's strategic plan for the first period) and not greater than 52.4% (the weight of the sustainable development agenda in Germany's strategic plan for the second period).

The recent strategic document with the strongest security flavour is that of the UK (33.9% of total quotes), followed by that of France, the Netherlands, and Germany. This reveals a strong change for the UK with regard to the first period – references to the security paradigm in the earlier document were at only 17% of total (see Chapter 4 on the UK). In terms of that first period, the heaviest security narrative was that of France, followed by the Netherlands, the UK, and Germany.

All four donors are found to have strengthened their security narratives, although to different degrees. The increase in the share of quotes labelled with the

security code family totals 17.1 percentage points for the UK, 8.6 for Germany, 5.3 in the case of the Netherlands, and 1.9 in France.

As already mentioned, families of codes bring together labels related to distinct goals of development assistance (from poverty eradication to migration control) as well as to motives behind aid. Aid can be the result of a moral responsibility on the part of donors (paradigm 1), or of a sense of partnership in building global public goods (paradigm 2) or of the promotion of national interests (paradigm 3).

As in the two EU Consensuses for Development, motives for aid are here found to represent only a minor part of the strategic discourse by individual donor states. Only 107 quotes out of a total 1,224 referred to the motives of aid (for the four donors as a whole) (Table 10.7). The distributions of these quotes across periods and donors yield very interesting results. First, a significant increase is observed in the overall number of references to the motives of aid: 23 in the first period, and 84 in the second. Therefore, it would seem that recent political events in Europe call for clear justifications on the part of donors of why public funds should be channelled for development purposes. Second, this increase is concentrated into selfish motives: solidarity as a motive has nearly doubled (from 5 to 9), the argument of common goods has likewise increased (from 9 to 17), while reasons of self-interest have skyrocketed, from 9 references to 58. Third, not all selected donors make the case for aid with the same insistence, and not all of them point out selfish reasons with the same intensity. The argument of self-interest is expressed in the second period by the Netherlands and the UK almost exclusively. France's narrative of aid scarcely addresses its motives (0 references in the first period, 2 in the second, both referring to common goods). Similarly,

**TABLE 10.7** Motives of aid in EU member state discourses (number of quotes by code)

<i>1st period</i>	<i>Solidarity / Moral obligation / Responsibility</i>	<i>Common efforts / Common goods / Common interests / Global Public Goods</i>	<i>Self-help/ Self-Interest</i>	<i>Total</i>
Netherlands	3	0	3	6
UK	1	5	4	10
Germany	1	4	2	7
France	0	0	0	0
Total	5	9	9	23
<i>2nd period</i>	<i>Solidarity / Moral obligation / Responsibility</i>	<i>Common efforts / Common goods / Common interests / Global Public Goods</i>	<i>Self-help/ Self-Interest</i>	<i>Total</i>
Netherlands	3	8	32	43
UK	5	2	26	33
Germany	1	5	0	6
France	0	2	0	2
Total	9	17	58	84

Source: Authors' elaboration.

motives of aid are limited to just 13 references in the German documents (7 in the first period, 6 in the second).

Notably, despite the fact that selfish motives are (in very general terms) more present in the security discourse, while moral responsibility tends to be associated with the social development paradigm, references to national interests need not be limited to matters of security and defence. In fact, the Dutch strategy argues mainly for commercial interests: “These developments call for a new aid, trade, and investment agenda. At international level, we are pursuing three important aims. First, to eradicate extreme poverty (‘getting to zero’) in a single generation; second, sustainable, inclusive growth all over the world; and third, success for Dutch companies abroad” (MFA, 2013, p. 6).

## Conclusions

The aim of this chapter has been to explore whether the European narrative on aid has in recent years tended to place a greater emphasis on security in making the case for aid (sometimes called ‘securitisation of the aid discourse’). Although the European Consensuses on Development (texts that gather and balance the distinct political views of aid from all EU member states, as well as from the EU institutions) do not reveal a clear securitisation of aid, individual strategic documents from the key European donors clearly do. This is not a feature that is exclusive to the EU. As detailed in Chapter 3, security is a key component in the case for aid in the US. Moreover, there is a strong emphasis on the part of various donors that may correspond to distinct political cycles in different European states.

In line with the conclusions of Chapters 1 and 2 of this book, our results further show that aid arguments need not to be exclusive, even when very different: social and sustainable development, security, self-interest, and solidarity can all coexist in aid narratives. Indeed, they actually do: what appears to have changed between the early 2000s and the present is that different emphases have been given to different paradigms and motives.

This raises the interesting question of who these documents are written for; clearly, the design processes of the diverse documents under review and the political debates around them might be very different. While the EU Consensuses on Development have been debated internationally, among peer nations, individual strategies might conceivably be negotiated with (and written for) domestic political stakeholders. In that regard, important shifts in the aid narratives of certain donors might be linked to changes in governing party or administration, as well as to changing social, economic, and political climates at the national level.

## Notes

- 1 The authors are grateful for very valuable comments from this book’s co-authors, particularly specific suggestions by Olav Stokke, Gino Pauselli, and Balazs Svent-Ivanyi.
- 2 For a more comprehensive survey of this literature, see Chapter 2 of this book.

- 3 Both Brown *et al.* (2016) and Furness and Ganzle (2016) associate the ‘whole-of-government approach’ with a discourse of securitised aid. However, it could be argued that this concept, linked to the agenda on policy coherence for development, might be reflecting a sense of coherent external action towards a single set of goals that could be aligned with any of the three paradigms (and not exclusively with the third). Therefore, we have not included this concept in our list of codes.

## Bibliography

- Alesina, A. & Dollar, D. (2000) ‘Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?’, *Journal of Economic Growth*, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 33–63.
- Alesina, A. & Weder, B. (2002) ‘Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?’, *The American Economic Review*, vol. 92, no. 4, pp. 1126–1137.
- Bermeo, S. B. (2017) ‘Aid Allocation and Targeted Development in an Increasingly Connected World’, *International Organization*, vol. 71, no. 4, pp. 735–766.
- Bermeo, S. B. & Leblang, D. (2015) ‘Migration and Foreign Aid’, *International Organization*, vol. 69, no. 3, pp. 627–657.
- Berthélemy, J.-C. (2006) ‘Aid Allocation: Comparing Donors’ Behaviors’, *Swedish Economic Policy Review*, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 75–109.
- Birdsall, N., Claessens, S. & Diwan, I. (2003) ‘Policy Selectivity Forgone: Debt and Donor Behavior in Africa’, *World Bank Economic Review*, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 409–435.
- Boutton, A. & Carter, D. B. (2014) ‘Fair-Weather Allies? Terrorism and the Allocation of US Foreign Aid’, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 58, no. 7, pp. 1144–1173.
- Braun, J. & Zagler, M. (2018) ‘The True Art of the Tax Deal: Evidence on Aid Flows and Bilateral Double Tax Agreements’, *World Economy*, vol. 41, no. 6, pp. 1478–1507.
- Brown, S., Grävingholt J. & Raddatz R. (2016) ‘The Securitization of Foreign Aid: Trends, Explanations and Prospects’, in Brown & Grävingholt, *The Securitization of Foreign Aid*, Ch. 11, pp. 237–255, Palgrave Macmillan.
- CICID (2018) *Relevé de conclusions*, Comité Interministériel de la Coopération Internationale et du Développement (CICID).
- CICID (2002) *Relevé de conclusions*, Comité Interministériel de la Coopération Internationale et du Développement (CICID).
- Clist, P. (2011) ‘25 Years of Aid Allocation Practice: Whither Selectivity?’, *World Development*, vol. 39, no. 10, pp. 1724–1734.
- DFID (2000) *Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor. White Paper on International Development*, Department for International Development.
- DG for International Cooperation (2003) *Mutual Interests, Mutual Responsibilities Dutch Development Cooperation en Route to 2015*, Directorate-General for International Cooperation.
- Dollar, D. & Levin V. (2006) ‘The Increasing Selectivity of Foreign Aid, 1984–2003’, *World Development*, vol. 34, no. 12, pp. 2034–2046.
- Dreher, A., Mölders F. & Nunnenkamp, P. (2010) ‘Aid Delivery Through Non-Governmental Organisations: Does the Aid Channel Matter for the Targeting of Swedish Aid?’, *The World Economy*, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 147–176.
- Dreher, A., Nunnenkamp P., Thiel S. & Thiele, R. (2012) ‘Aid Allocation by German NGOs: Does the Degree of Official Financing Matter?’, *World Economy*, vol. 35, no. 11, pp. 1448–1472.
- Dreher, A., Nunnenkamp P. & Thiele, R. (2011) ‘Are ‘New’ Donors Different? Comparing the Allocation of Bilateral Aid Between non-DAC and DAC Donor Countries’, *World Development*, vol. 39, no. 11, pp. 1950–1968.



- Dudley, L. & Montmarquette, C. (1976) 'A Model of the Supply of Bilateral Foreign Aid', *The American Economic Review*, vol. 66, no. 1, pp. 132–142.
- European Commission (2006) *The European Consensus on Development*, DE 129, European Commission, June.
- European Commission (2017) *New European Consensus on Development – 'Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future'*, Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission.
- Faust, J. & Messner, D. (2004) 'Europe's New Security Strategy – Challenges for Development Policy', *Discussion Paper 3/2004*, German Development Institute (Die).
- Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (2014) *Charter for the Future – One World, Our Responsibility*, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.
- Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (2001) *Poverty Reduction – a Global Responsibility. Program of Action 2015, The German Government's Contribution Toward Halving Extreme Poverty Worldwide*, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.
- Furness, M. & Gänzle, S. (2016) 'The European Union's Development Policy: A Balancing Act between 'a More Comprehensive Approach' and 'Creeping Securitisation' in Brown & Grävingholt, *The Securitization of Foreign Aid*, Ch. 7, pp. 138–162, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Heinrich, T., Kobayashi, Y. & Long, L. (2018) 'Voters Get What They Want (When They Pay Attention): Human Rights, Policy Benefits, and Foreign Aid', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 195–207.
- HM & DFID (2015) *UK Aid: Tackling Global Challenges in the National Interest*, HM Treasury, Department for International Development, 2015.
- Hoang, H. H. (2014) 'Aid Darling and the European Union's Aid Allocation Policy: The Case of Vietnam', *Asia Europe Journal*, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 301–324.
- Hoefler, A. & Outram, V. (2011) 'Need, Merit or Self-Interest. What Determines the Allocation of Aid?' *Review of Development Economics*, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 237–250.
- Isopi, A. & Mavrotas, G. (2006) 'Aid Allocation and Aid Effectiveness', *UNU-WIDER Research Paper 2006/07*, United Nations University, Helsinki, January.
- Keukeleire, S. & Raube, K. (2013) 'The Security-Development Nexus and Securitization in the EU's Policies towards Developing Countries', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 1–17.
- Kim, Y. & Jensen, C. (2018) 'Preferences and Institutions: Constraints on European Union Foreign Aid Distribution', *Journal of European Integration*, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 177–192.
- Kisangani, E. F. & Pickering, J. (2015) 'Soldiers and Development Aid: Military Intervention and Foreign Aid Flows', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 215–227.
- Le Blanc, D. (2015) 'Towards Integration at Last? The Sustainable Development Goals as a Network of Targets', *Sustainable Development*, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 176–187.
- Loman, B., Pop, I. & Ruben, R. (2011) 'Follow the Leader: How Dutch Development NGOs Allocate Their Resources. The Contradictory Influence of Donor Dependency', *Journal of International Development*, vol. 23, no. 5, pp. 641–655.
- Lundsgaarde, E., Breunig, C. & Prakash, A. (2010) 'Instrumental Philanthropy: Trade and the Allocation of Foreign Aid', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 733–761.
- Maizels, A. & Nissanke, M. (1984) 'Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries', *World Development*, vol. 22, no. 9, pp. 879–900.

- McKinley, R. D. & Little, R. (1979) 'The US Aid Relationship: A Test of the Recipient Need and Donor Interest Models', *Political Studies*, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 236–250.
- McKinley, R. D. & Little, R. (1978b) 'A Foreign-Policy Model of the Distribution of British Bilateral Aid, 1960–70', *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 313–332.
- McKinley, R. D. & Little, R. (1978a) 'The German Aid Relationship: A Test of the Recipient Need and the Donor Interest Models of the Distribution of German Bilateral Aid, 1961–1970', *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 235–257.
- MFA (2013) *A World to Gain: A New Agenda for Aid, Trade and Investment*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.
- Metzger, L., Nunnenkamp, P. & Mahmoud, T. O. (2009) 'Is Corporate Aid Targeted to Poor and Deserving Countries? A Case Study of Nestlé's Aid Allocation', *World Development*, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 228–243.
- Miles, W.F.S. (2012) 'Deploying Development to Counter Terrorism: Post-9/11 Transformation of U.S. Foreign Aid to Africa', *African Studies Review*, vol. 55, no. 3, pp. 27–60.
- Mosley, P. (2006) 'Models of the Aid Allocation Process: A Comment on McKinley and Little', *Political Studies*, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 245–253.
- Narang, N. (2016) 'Forgotten Conflicts: Need versus Political Priority in the Allocation of Humanitarian Aid across Conflict Areas', *International Interactions*, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 189–216.
- Neumayer, E. (2003) 'Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocation? A Quantitative Analysis of 21 Donor Countries', *Social Science Quarterly*, vol. 84, no. 3, pp. 650–666.
- Nunnenkamp, P. & Öhler, H. (2011) 'Aid Allocation through Various Official and Private Channels: Need, Merit and Self-Interest as Motives of German Donors', *World Development*, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 308–323.
- Orbie, J. & Del Biondo, K. (2015) 'The European Union's 'Comprehensive Approach'', in 'Chad: Securitisation and/or Compartmentalisation?', *Global Society*, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 243–259.
- Petrikova, I. (2016) 'Promoting "Good Behaviour" Through Aid: Do "New" Donors Differ from the "Old" Ones?', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 153–192.
- Petrikova, I. & Lazell, M. (2017) 'Multilateral Donors and the Security-Development Nexus: Discourse and Practice in Conflict-Affected States', *Conflict, Security and Development*, vol. 17, no. 6, pp. 493–516.
- Reynaert, V. (2011) 'Explaining EU Aid Allocation in the Mediterranean: A Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis', *Mediterranean Politics*, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 405–426.
- Sachs, J. (2012) 'From Millennium Development Goals to Sustainable Development Goals', *The Lancet*, no. 379, pp. 2206–2211.
- Schraeder, P. J., Hook, S. W. & Taylor, B. (1998) 'Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle. A Comparison of American, Japanese, French and Swedish Aid Flows', *World Politics*, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 294–323.
- Steele, C. A. (2017) 'Public Goods and Donor Priorities: The Political Economy of Development Aid for Infectious Disease Control', *Foreign Policy Analysis*, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 988–1002.
- Szent-Ivanyi, B. (2012) 'Aid Allocation of the Emerging Central and Eastern European Donors', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 65–89.